1) Qinyuanchun · Changsha (沁园春·长沙)

The Poem:

Standing alone in the cold autumn, the Xiang River flows north, past the tip of Orange Isle.

I see ten thousand mountains turned red, layers of forests deeply dyed; the broad river is a translucent emerald, a hundred barges strive against the current.

Eagles strike at the vast sky, fish soar in the shallow depths; all creatures under the frosty sky contend for freedom.

Lost in the immensity, I ask the boundless earth: Who rules over the ups and downs of destiny?

I brought a hundred companions to roam here before, recalling the thick, towering years of the past.

We were students then, in the prime of our youth; with a scholar’s idealism, showing our sharpest mettle.

Pointing at the mountains and rivers, our writings stirred the world, treating the powerful lords of those years as mere dust.

Do you remember? Reaching the midstream and striking the water, the waves stayed the speeding boats.

The Commentary:

This poem was written in 1925, when Mao Zedong was 31 years old, at Orange Isle in Changsha. At this time, Mao had just returned to Changsha from Guangzhou, serving as the head of the Kuomintang (KMT) Hunan Provincial Party Headquarters. 1924–1927 was the period of the First United Front—a brief cooperation between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang to "align with Russia, align with the Communists, and assist peasants and workers" to jointly fight Northern Warlords and achieve national unity.

In 1924, the scale of the Communist Party was very small and weak, said to be only at the level of a thousand people; its strength was far from being able to overthrow the Northern Warlords, at most counting as a small detachment. At that time, it is said the Soviet Union suggested the CCP take an "internal cooperation" approach, letting Communists join the KMT as individuals to cooperate and infiltrate from within, pushing leftist politics. The CCP's goal was to overthrow the feudal system, oppose capitalism, and establish a proletarian regime, advocating for land revolution, socialism, and a Soviet-style organizational model.

The KMT in its early days was center-right. Wang Jingwei supported cooperation with the CCP, leaned toward Soviet aid, and supported certain land reforms and labor policies; whereas Chiang Kai-shek rejected the Communists, emphasizing nationalism and centralized military power. He feared the CCP would mobilize "peasant revolts" to destroy social order, relying more on the military, merchants, and the landlord class. As it turned out, everything Chiang Kai-shek feared happened. And the CCP eventually seized military power, and to this day firmly controls land, the military, and occasionally strikes at commerce. They call it "opposing the right," but in the end, they seized all the power of the so-called "rightists" and obtained all the "right-wing powers."

Mao Zedong’s writing is quite good. Back then, Orange Isle was indeed as he described—looking at the banks, the maple leaves really turned the mountains red, with all kinds of birds and fish flying and swimming; it wasn't crowded with tourists like it is now. Reading through the whole piece, you can feel his confusion at the time. Although "pointing at the mountains and rivers" with great ambition, he was uncertain who could "rule the ups and downs." He wasn't even 32 yet—exactly the same age as I am now—and he already wanted to dominate the tides of history. To me, this question is meaningless: no one can dominate the tides of history; everyone is an inevitability in the long river of time.

In my view, his behavior suggests an overestimation of the impact of individual choice on results. No matter what everyone chooses, the result is the same. It isn't a person, an event, or a thing ruling the heavens and earth; it is all events together, piling up into an inevitability. Whether it’s the Communist Party, the Kuomintang, Liang Qichao, or the Hundred Days' Reform. Regardless of the method, there was a need to temporarily abandon some old behavioral norms and social exchange modes that no longer suited society, and try new structures that could drive social development.

2) Mistakes (错误)

The Long March, the famines, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, the "Down to the Countryside" movement, and family planning (One-Child Policy) do not belong in this scope. Any reform, if it reaches the price of sacrificing 20 to 30 million lives, the initiators should reconsider—otherwise, it is a blatant disregard for human life. Any one of these events, taken alone, is a gargantuan disaster for a time of peace. I asked ChatGPT if there were disasters in Chinese history comparable to these; it answered: very few, and listed specific figures for me.

The Long March took place from 1934 to 1936; out of 80,000 Red Army soldiers, fewer than 10,000 survived. An eight-to-one survival rate. As for the Great Leap Forward and the Three Years of Famine, the total deaths were roughly 15 to 45 million. The Cultural Revolution caused direct deaths of about one to two million, but the actual "abnormal death" count is higher. For "Down to the Countryside," the death toll is unknown, but the sacrifice was extremely high. For family planning, "abnormal death" data cannot be calculated, but abortions and the killing of female infants were widespread. Before I was born, I also had an elder sister who was aborted. Because of family planning, I almost didn't make it here to write this article for you; thinking of this makes my hair stand on end.

I insisted on asking ChatGPT which specific events could rival these in terms of casualties. It mentioned the "Poll Tax and Household Reform" in the mid-Yuan Dynasty (14th century), which brought plague and forced migrations, causing large numbers of "Semu" and Han people to be forcibly reassigned and demoted to "mean status." Massive population shifts to the far north and south led to widespread death. ChatGPT evaluated this as "structural tyranny" and discriminatory management based on race and status. Also, the partial implementation of Wang Anshi’s "Green Sprouts Law" in the Northern Song led to mass bankruptcy and sudden deaths among peasants; though not intentional slaughter, the policy was idealistic and detached from reality, causing tragic livelihoods. Certain regions saw sharp population declines due to forced loans and violent collection.

In 1959, China's population was about 660 million. If 30 million died, it means 1 out of every 22 people passed away. The Nazi Holocaust killed about six million Jews, while the Soviet Great Purge and the Holodomor killed about 10 to 15 million. Calculating based on 1,095 days in three years, the Three Years of Famine meant an average of nearly 30,000 deaths per day—meaning the population of an entire county was starved to death every single day. I found out that in the year my mother was born, her village only had about 10,000 people. This directly caused a generational break in many rural areas—an entire generation of people died. Whole villages starved to death, leaving only a few elderly and children who lost their reproductive capacity or lacked the conditions for it.

Siblings eating each other, parents abandoning infants, the elderly taking their own lives—these are not exaggerations, but events that actually happened. The survivors fell silent, like my mother, no longer taking the initiative to talk about the previous generation. Descendants even changed their surnames, fled, and cut ties with their original identities. I only realized that for my generation, if your family still has a genealogy (Zupu), it is a type of privilege—it means your ancestors perfectly avoided all these human tragedies.

At that time, Henan, Anhui, and Sichuan were the hardest-hit areas. These provinces were originally major agricultural and populous provinces, yet because production targets were extremely inflated—constantly claiming "ten thousand catties per mu"—all the grain was handed over to the state, leaving the local areas with nothing. The central government forced grain collection regardless of life or death; even if there was no harvest, the "purchase quota" had to be met, and even the "rations" were hauled away. Originally densely populated, once grain was scarce, deaths occurred by the millions. Meanwhile, "Hukou Walls" were built to prevent "grain-peasants" from escaping the countryside. Many starved to death in their villages, unable to move. In Anhui, specifically Fengyang and Su counties, the death rate was extremely high, exceeding 60% in some areas. Rural areas with populations of nearly 400,000 were left with only 100,000. Some villages disappeared entirely; you can still see traces of "Ownerless Empty Villages" on maps today. Many passed down by word of mouth: "so hungry they ate dirt, gnawed tree bark, and ate human corpses."

Among them, the "Xinyang Incident" was one of the earliest, most severe, and most studied regional disasters of the Great Famine. The death toll was between one and three million, with some townships having whole villages starve to death or leaving only one or two survivors. Local cadres competed for "Red Flags," falsely reporting yields of tens of thousands of catties, but the actual harvest was abysmal. To hand over grain according to the reported yield, even the commoners' seed grain and rations were taken away. Local cadres, fearing "exposure of the problem through starvation," ordered the blockade of villages to prevent fleeing. Tombstone (Yang Jisheng) details the Xinyang Incident and is one of the most systematic sources available. The Temple, The Xinyang Incident: A Painful Historical Lesson, and others also contain many survivor memoirs. It is said internal documents called Xinyang "a severe policy execution disaster to be taken as a warning," yet no officials were ever truly held accountable.

3) Qinyuanchun · Snow (沁园春·雪)

The Poem:

North country scene: A thousand miles sealed in ice, ten thousand miles of whirling snow.

Looking inside and outside the Great Wall, only a vast wilderness remains; up and down the Great River, the torrents are suddenly stilled.

Mountains dance like silver snakes, highlands charge like waxen elephants, vying with the heavens in height.

On a fine day, see the land clad in white, adorned in red—surpassing in beauty.

Such is the beauty of our mountains and rivers, that countless heroes have bowed in homage.

Yet, the Emperors of Qin and Han lacked literary grace; the Sovereigns of Tang and Song were short on poetic soul.

Genghis Khan, the favored son of Heaven for a day, knew only how to bend his bow at the great eagles.

All are gone now. To find truly great men, we must look to the present age.

The Commentary:

Since the last time he wrote Changsha, another 11 years have passed. Mao Zedong was about 42 years old then. Eleven years later, he transformed from a youth writing lyrics by the Xiang River into a historical architect critiquing emperors upon the snowy ground. He no longer sighs about "who rules the ups and downs," but says directly: "Look to the present age." This "look" is control, it is dominance, it is a manifesto.

In the late Qing Dynasty, the government signed many treaties to sell important national industries like railways to foreigners; "Railway Protection Movements" broke out in Sichuan, Hubei, and other places. Meanwhile, southern revolutionaries like Sun Yat-sen had long been secretly planning armed uprisings. There were many Tongmenghui members in the Wuchang New Army; amidst high tension, they decided to launch the uprising early. On the night of October 10, 1911, the New Army Engineering Battalion revolted first, occupying Wuchang. They immediately established the "Hubei Military Government," announced their break from the Qing court, and founded the Republic of China. The success of the uprising quickly inspired all provinces: Sichuan, Hunan, Yunnan, Guangdong, and Fujian declared independence one after another. Within two months, fourteen provinces broke away from Qing control.

The Qing government was panic-stricken and urgently recalled Yuan Shikai, the "Beiyang Minister" and actual holder of military power, to suppress the uprising. But the situation was already out of control; the Beiyang Army had strong combat power but didn't want to die for the Qing court. So in 1912, Sun Yat-sen served as the Provisional President of the newly established Nanjing government, proposing the "Three Principles of the People." But to avoid civil war, Sun Yat-sen decided to compromise, yielding the position to Yuan Shikai on the condition that Puyi abdicated. Remember this decision by Sun Yat-sen. This decision marked the fall of the Qing Dynasty and the end of China's two thousand years of monarchy.

Although the Qing was overthrown, China was not unified. Yuan Shikai led the Beiyang Government, centered in Beijing, controlling the nominal regime. But as mentioned, fourteen provinces had declared independence; they didn't recognize Yuan. Moreover, the Beiyang Government was far from the south and was powerless. The central government couldn't manage the "local snakes." Then, Sun Yat-sen came again, establishing the National Government in Guangzhou, vowing to launch the Northern Expedition. He founded the Whampoa Military Academy, and it was here that Chiang Kai-shek rose from the academy. The KMT also began accepting Soviet aid and started the first cooperation with the CCP; Mao Zedong wrote Qinyuanchun · Changsha. He was "lying low" in the KMT, waiting for his moment.

In 1926, the KMT began the Northern Expedition with Chiang Kai-shek as Commander-in-Chief. After half a year of fighting from summer to winter, they were victorious at every turn; peasant and worker movements surged, and the CCP's strength rose. The CCP began confiscating land, mobilizing strikes, and attacking old authorities; simultaneously, they called on workers and peasants to resist landlords and capitalists, and advocated for worker-peasant organizations to directly manage local power. To the KMT, their "mobilization was too radical," already "threatening social order," showing signs of wanting to seize power. According to ChatGPT, Mao Zedong pushed radical policies in the Hunan peasant movement, enraging the local landlord class. Worker strikes affected the urban economy, causing strong dissatisfaction among KMT right-wingers and the merchant class. I can understand this—after all, it was the KMT doing the fighting; the CCP at the time could at most be considered "external relations." For an external relations team to stir up such a mess, if I were Chiang Kai-shek, I wouldn't cooperate either. But a massacre is something I couldn't do.

Later, Chiang Kai-shek launched the "April 12 Purge," uniting with the military, police, and Shanghai gangs; overnight, a large number of Communists, union members, and leftists were slaughtered. Thousands died within days; the nation's leftists were shocked. The Communist Party went underground and to the countryside, starting an armed struggle. Mao Zedong tried to respond with armed uprisings, launching the Autumn Harvest Uprising, but failed. That was his first time commanding an armed revolt. He was criticized within the party for "opportunism" and gradually marginalized. He realized urban revolts were unsustainable—that was Chiang Kai-shek’s turf, where he knew the police and the gangs. Mao turned to rural guerrilla warfare. In 1927, the Communist Party had about 50,000 members. After the purge, it plummeted to between 10,000 and 15,000.

4) Acting Head of Propaganda for the KMT Hunan Provincial Headquarters

I was curious about what exactly Mr. Mao was responsible for when he was in the Kuomintang, and sure enough, he was the Head of the Propaganda Department—though he was the "Acting" one. This must have been his bread-and-butter work; he could read, write poetry, and write articles, having a great capacity for agitation in spreading "new ideas," making many intellectuals feel deeply understood. Propaganda Head, in modern terms, is the one responsible for propaganda. I think I have some of his genes in my body; I'm so good at this, it turns out I learned it from the elders.

Before this, Mr. Mao was already an active local figure in Hunan. In 1920, he founded the Culture Book Society in a two-story building on Wuyi Road in Changsha. Even now, Wuyi Road is still the center of the old city; although this building is gone, one can imagine the prosperity at the time. This Book Society was called a Culture Society externally, but internally, it was actually a base for revolutionary organizations. I remember seeing in Bodyguards and Assassins long ago how using a publishing house as cover for a revolutionary base was very common at the time; both the CCP and the Revive China Society did it. The Culture Book Society spread Marxist, democratic, and anti-warlord ideas by selling books like New Youth, The Communist Manifesto, Biography of Marx, and History of Socialism. He wrote leaflets, slogans, and pamphlets, gave lectures, and started "commoners' night schools" to teach workers and the poor how to read and write. This is a very good thing, except I am not sure if Mr. Mao really wanted them to be literate so they could make their own judgments, or to make it easier for him to incite revolution. I strongly doubt whether Mr. Mao’s so-called "awakening" was a true awakening. It seems it was just giving himself a reason to overthrow a powerful authority; the goal was still to hold power himself. After all, the promises made before taking power were not kept after the founding of New China, and in "practice," they caused even worse impacts than the warlords.

Many Beiyang warlords were from Anhui, and the ruler of Hunan at the time, Zhang Jingyao, was no exception—a former subordinate of Yuan Shikai and part of the "Anhui clique." Just as there are many factions within the Party now, it was the same before. He served in the Qing Army early on, then joined the Anhui clique leader Duan Qirui, and in 1918 was appointed "Military Governor of Hunan," meaning he was the military commander and supreme local administrative official, with military and political power integrated. Although Zhang Jingyao’s rule only lasted two years, he was notorious locally for repeatedly taxing and seizing grain. He appointed cronies as local bureaucrats, controlled all of Hunan, and suppressed student movements and strikes, not hesitating to open fire. He was an alcoholic and publicly took female students by force. Weak toward outsiders, he succumbed to Japanese economic plunder of Hunan, yet internally treated the area as private property, extorting and plundering.

Mr. Mao wanted to overthrow him and started the "Expel Zhang Movement." Mr. Mao didn't have guns; he knew his capital was the right to speak, the youth, and social influence. He mobilized students, workers, merchants, and teachers, starting to write and distribute a large number of anti-Zhang articles, pamphlets, and leaflets, listing the "Six Crimes of Expelling Zhang": corruption and bribery, oppressing the people, suppressing students, selling out national interests, insulting women, and occupying Hunan without withdrawing troops. These situations still exist now, just with different people, different places, and different methods. Mr. Mao’s propaganda materials were reasoning, but also manufacturing anger and providing a framework of legitimacy. He said this person was no good, but you have to say, what are your specific operational methods? How will you operate? What do you plan to do? Bring out your plan for a national referendum! How is it that it’s still you who has the final say, still "top-down"?

I think this is why every time he launched a "revolution" or a "movement," he always needed to find a justification for himself. He felt this made him different. If a revolution is not spontaneous and natural, but in the form of war, coercion, and violence, I fear that no matter how grand your reason, you haven't helped the people you thought you were helping much. I have had deep feelings about this lately. He has his thoughts, I have mine, and others have theirs. No matter what the thought is—one person, one sentence—discuss it together. "Top-down," or even "indirect election" and "parliamentary systems" are not direct democracy. These "indirect democracies" have quite a bit of wiggle room. With systems so rigged now, many problems can't be solved. To say certain people aren't "occupying the latrine without defecating," I find it hard to believe. This is the same all over the world, not targeting any specific country.

Mr. Mao, during the Northern Expedition, was in the KMT Hunan Provincial Headquarters as the Acting Propaganda Head in his capacity as a Communist. He obtained this position because in 1923, Sun Yat-sen proposed "aligning with Russia, the CCP, and assisting peasants and workers" to start KMT-CCP cooperation. The Soviets pushed CCP members to "join the KMT as individuals," and to strengthen grassroots mobilization, the KMT accepted CCP talents in local party headquarters. At that time, the central government had completely failed; the Beiyang warlord Yuan Shikai controlled Beijing, while local warlords were entrenched, and the common people suffered unspeakably. Sun Yat-sen was conducting the "Constitution Protection Movement" in Guangzhou, but several Northern Expeditions failed; they simply couldn't defeat the Beiyang army. The KMT lacked soldiers, money, and territory, and was deeply divided internally; facing Northern Warlords and foreign powers, they could only adopt the method of uniting with the CCP, Russia, and assisting peasants and workers to strengthen themselves.

In 1917, the Soviet Union was just established and wanted to export revolution; it needed to find allies in the East. Western powers all rejected Sun Yat-sen, considering him a radical anti-order element. The Soviet Union took the initiative to contact the KMT, providing military advisors, training support, and financial aid. Sun Yat-sen planned to use the CCP to drive the grassroots, while the KMT held power—this was the basis of the first KMT-CCP cooperation. Mr. Mao used his influence at the First Normal School to organize joint strikes, parades, and petitions across various Changsha colleges, establishing the "Changsha Student Union" and pulling in the whole province. Not only that, he also won over the Hunan Chamber of Commerce and industrial circles to organize "market strikes," creating local economic pressure. His mass line didn't rely only on the poor, but leveraged the different interest demands of various classes within the unity of contradictions. He sent the petition materials and "Expel Zhang" propaganda of the Hunan people to Beijing, using progressive newspapers like the Republic Daily to spread the current situation in Hunan and pressure the Beiyang government. At that time, the "Anhui" and "Zhili" cliques within Beiyang were fighting; Mr. Mao knew Zhang Jingyao was "Anhui clique," so ruining his reputation would make it convenient for the central government to remove him. Seeing this, I deeply understand the reactionary genes in Mr. Mao; his organizational, propaganda, and mobilization abilities, as well as his ability to manufacture chaos, were very strong. Why is this? Is it the instinct of a Hunanese? I am deeply reflecting.

5) Expelling Warlords

The "Expel Zhang Movement" took place in the summer of 1920; it had only been two years since Zhang Jingyao was appointed Military Governor of Hunan by the Beiyang government in 1918. Mao Zedong had not yet joined the Chinese Communist Party; he appeared only as a local radical intellectual and reformer in Hunan, residing in propaganda and mobilizing the masses, organizing strikes, market closures, and demonstrations. In November 1920, Zhang Jingyao was forced to leave Hunan, reassigned by the Beiyang government. Mr. Mao tasted the sweetness of organizing the masses and personally experienced the actual effect of mobilizing grassroots people to pressure power.

With Zhang Jingyao's departure, Hunan saw a brief political vacuum. The new Military Governor, Zhao Hengti, though from the Beiyang system, was relatively moderate and pragmatically political. Zhao Hengti was from Ningxiang, Hunan, born as a Qing Dynasty Xiucai, later studying law in Japan; he belonged to the early enlightened bureaucracy. After the Xinhai Revolution, he worked in the Beiyang government's judicial system, serving as a judge and Minister of Justice. Before becoming Military Governor, he had also served as the Governor of Hunan Province. He belonged to the so-called Beiyang clique, but wasn't part of the core warlord cliques like Anhui or Zhili; he was a secondary-level technical bureaucrat of local origin.

At that time, public opinion in Hunan was high; students, the merchant class, and intellectuals generally hoped to use the momentum of the "Expel Zhang" victory to push local reforms in Hunan, break free from central warlord control, and achieve "Hunan Autonomy." Many southern provinces had similar tendencies at the time, with Hunan being the most radical, and Mao Zedong was an active promoter of this trend.

In the first half of 1921, Mr. Mao launched and edited the Xiang River Review in Changsha, proposing the idea of "Hunanese ruling Hunan." He criticized the Beiyang warlords as being "far away in Beijing, unaware of Hunan's suffering," and advocated for a provincial assembly elected by the people to implement a local autonomy system. He once joined with Yang Changji—his father-in-law and teacher—linguist Li Jinxi, Xie Juezai, and others to propose the preliminary framework for the Draft Constitution of Hunan Province, planning to establish a provincial assembly, elect a governor, and have independent finances. Today, this might be seen like Hong Kong or Taiwan independence, viewed as "Hunan independence." But the internet hadn't appeared yet, there were no "water armies," and cancel culture didn't exist. At the time, not just Hunan, but all other provinces followed suit. Everyone hoped for relative autonomy, self-management, and self-sufficiency.

This confirms an idea I've long held: China, rather than being a "People's Republic," is more like a "United Provinces of China." From what I've seen of regional cultural differences and the "local snake" culture among various provinces and municipalities, each province is almost a relatively independent cultural entity. Different concepts, preferences, languages, cultures, traditions, and the top-down hierarchy between provincial, municipal, and district levels, with relative independence between peers—different regions vary greatly. Law enforcement, administration habits, and rules are also completely different. Compared to today's provincial governments under central concentration that completely follow central orders, the terms for local financial and educational autonomy in the Draft Constitution of Hunan Province actually represented a primal fantasy of "Federalism." During this period, Mao Zedong was still between a reformer and the "United Provinces Autonomy" mindset, which shows a clear rupture with his later extreme centralism.

In the Fundamental Issue of Hunan Construction Issues published on September 3, 1920, Mr. Mao wrote: "There was once a fallacy that 'in the future world, countries that can survive must be big countries.' This discourse spread poison, expanding imperialism, suppressing one's own weak nations, and competing for overseas colonies, turning semi-civilized and uncivilized nations into complete slaves... English, Americans, Germans, French, Russians, and Austrians all fortunately reaped successes that were actually unsuccessful. There is one more, China, which hasn't even reaped the 'success that was actually unsuccessful.' What has been reaped is the disappearance of Manchus; Mongolians, Hui, and Tibetans are at death's door; the eighteen provinces are a mess, creating three governments, three parliaments, and over twenty 'Warlord Kings,' 'Civil Governor Kings,' and 'Commander-in-Chief Kings.' The common people are killed or raped every day, property is emptied, foreign debt is like a mountain—it is called a Republic, yet few citizens understand 'what a republic is.'" I agree with his logic here, though I don't know why the later execution deviated so much. I can't find document details; it seems many documents can't be accessed from non-mainland IPs now. I asked ChatGPT, and based on various documents, it inferred the Hunan Provincial Constitution might include the following:

• Provincial Assembly System: Every male over 21 has the right to vote. Provincial assembly members are produced through grassroots general elections, establishing the Hunan Provincial Assembly. The assembly has the power to formulate local regulations, budgets, and supervise administrative power.

• Popuarly Elected Governor: Proposed to abolish the Military Governor system appointed by the Beiyang government, with the "Provincial Governor" elected by the people. The governor is responsible to the assembly, with power restricted by legal procedures and a recall mechanism to ensure public supervision of local officials.

• Local Financial and Educational Autonomy: Provincial taxes are self-managed and not handed to central warlords; the financial budget is reviewed and passed by the provincial assembly. Educational power is handed to local authorities, with self-compiled textbooks, self-determined curricula, and the promotion of vernacular (Baihua) education and practical knowledge.

• Provincial Constitutional Guarantee of Rights: Clearly list basic human rights such as speech, press, assembly, and association. The military must be commanded by the popularly elected government, opposing "military interference in politics." Encourage autonomous civil organizations like unions and student groups to participate in governance.

At that time, many Hunan provincial assembly members and local figures proposed a series of constitutional reform suggestions after Zhao Hengti took power, such as setting up the provincial assembly and pushing limited general elections; promoting independent provincial financial budgets; and encouraging local educational institutions to set their own curricula, such as the vernacular teaching pushed by Li Jinxi. Zhao Hengti did not block these topics and even once stated they "could first be researched on a trial basis," leaving a blurred space. It was in this atmosphere of "tacit approval" that Mao Zedong, Li Jinxi, Xie Juezai, and others proposed the vision for the Draft Constitution of Hunan Province.

The Xiang River Review began publication in May 1921 in Changsha, proposing slogans like "Hunanese ruling Hunan" and criticizing the central concentration of Beiyang warlords. If Zhao Hengti had immediately voiced opposition, he could have completely shut down the publication on charges of "endangering national unity," but in the early stages, he chose not to intervene. In fact, it wasn't until several months later that the Xiang River Review was forced to stop publication, showing that Zhao Hengti was initially tolerant and observant. Zhao Hengti had studied law in Japan and served as Minister of Justice; he was no stranger to concepts like "constitutionalism" and "autonomy," and may even have personally agreed with parts of them; he just valued bureaucratic rationality and stable order more, not wanting reforms to be too radical.

The Beiyang Central leaders in Beijing like Duan Qirui and Cao Kun were essentially a military clique government. They did not agree with provincial legislation or elected governments, viewing them as a disguised federalism that might inspire local independent tendencies. Since warlords were already everywhere and the central government was weak, if Hunan set a precedent for autonomy, areas like Sichuan, Guangdong, and Yunnan—which were already "semi-independent"—would be even harder to control. They quickly shut down the Xiang River Review and ordered Zhao Hengti to suppress radical forces, deploying troops to intimidate Changsha, making it clear that the "Central government cannot be challenged."

Zhao Hengti began banning assemblies for various newly established autonomy-promoting groups, such as the "Hunan Constitutional Research Association" and "Autonomy Promotion Association," and sent military and police to shut down their offices. Many youth groups and student organizations were "persuaded to withdraw" and their registrations canceled, with some core members secretly summoned or threatened with expulsion. Though the superficial structure of "Provincial Assembly" and "Education Reform" was partially retained, Zhao Hengti placed crony gentry and moderate literati in key positions, essentially hollowing out the influence of the radicals. He reorganized the local teacher system and textbook compilation teams, squeezing out the voices of Mao Zedong and Li Jinxi from the decision-making circle. He coordinated with the central government to telegraph the nation, labeling the ideas of some Hunan radicals as "local separatism" and "disturbing national unity." Mao Zedong and others were labeled "local radicals" and "Hunan independence advocates," becoming isolated in the political ecology. The movement was also fractured internally; the radicals represented by Mao lacked coordination with moderate reformers and the local gentry, failing to form a united front.

At that time, there were the Radicals represented by Mao, mainly youth intellectuals like Mao Zedong, Cai Hesen, Xie Juezai, and Li Weihan—a generation grown under the New Culture Movement. Many had backgrounds in France or Japan, or were influenced by the Comintern, believing in socialism, mass mobilization, and social transformation. They insisted on the absolute abolition of the warlord system, advocating for general elections, provincial assemblies, and elected governors; they urged grassroots mobilization and the establishment of peasant and labor unions; they promoted the vernacular, literacy, anti-feudalism, and striking at gentry landlords.

Then there were the Moderate Reformers, or "Cultural Liberals." Major representatives included Yang Changji, Li Jinxi, Zhang Shizhao, Ren Bishi, and He Shuheng. Most were from the educational world, leaning toward gradual reform and institutional building rather than violent revolution. They advocated for local autonomy and parliamentary systems; establishing provincial constitutions and universal education; and supported cultural enlightenment and pluralistic public opinion, but did not advocate for mass revolts or class struggle. I think if I lived in that era, I would belong to this stream.

Finally, there was the Local Gentry, composed of landlords, gentry, old-style scholars, and local chamber members; they were the actual controllers of local finance, education, and security. They advocated for "stability first" and could accept limited reform but opposed mass mobilization. They were extremely wary of the peasant associations, unions, and mobilization of "proletarians" proposed by the radicals. They hoped to use autonomy to break central warlord control but did not want to change the local vested interest structure. However, they were conservative, opportunistic, and "fence-sitters." When facing central pressure, they quickly defected and leaned toward Beiyang. Once the situation was unfavorable, they cooperated in suppressing the radicals. Mao Zedong wanted the bottom to flip the top, Li Jinxi wanted cultural independence, and the local gentry wanted to get rid of Beijing but not the landlords. These three demands could not be integrated into a unified set of institutional actions, and in the end, under the pressure of Zhao Hengti and the Beiyang government, they were like loose sand—collapsing at the first touch.

6) United Province Autonomy (联省自治)

Hunan after "Expelling Zhang" once became a symbol of the United Province Autonomy wave. Mao Zedong's advocacy for "Hunanese ruling Hunan" was not just an expression of local sentiment, but a political experiment in "breaking away from the Warlord-Central system." But this attempt at autonomy did not receive sustained support. Under central pressure, Zhao Hengti became increasingly conservative, and radicals like Mao Zedong were marginalized. From late 1921 to early 1922, several "order rectification" actions took place in Hunan, suppressing peasant associations, student groups, and public opinion journals. The Xiang River Review was shut down in August 1921, marking the tightening of local political space. Mao Zedong could no longer find a place for himself in Hunan.

On July 23, 1921, the First National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held secretly in a residence in the Shanghai French Concession; later, because French Concession police noticed, the meeting moved to a cruise boat on South Lake in Jiaxing, Zhejiang, to be completed. Mao Zedong at the time had long been influenced by the thoughts of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, and was gradually becoming disappointed with the reformist path of Hunan local autonomy.

Prior to this, between 1919 and 1921, a group of Marxist study groups emerged across the country, known as "Communist Groups." These organizations were the predecessors of the CCP, serving to sow seeds, brew ideas, and organize human resources and thought preparation. The earliest group was organized by Li Dazhao at Peking University, while the Shanghai group was initiated by Chen Duxiu. The Changsha group was a very important one among them, actually led by Mao Zedong. After working in the Changsha Communist group, he was elected as one of the Hunan representatives to attend the meeting in Shanghai. The entire congress had 13 representatives, representing more than 50 Communist Party members nationwide. This is the famous First Congress of the CCP. I won't go into the details of the First Congress; I believe many documents can be found. Major events included establishing the party name as "Chinese Communist Party," defining the goal as overthrowing the bourgeois regime, establishing proletarian dictatorship, and realizing socialism and eventually communism. It also stipulated the monthly payment of party fees and prohibited members from participating in counter-revolutionary or religious organizations.

It is worth mentioning that a person in attendance was Henk Sneevliet (Marlin), a Comintern representative; he proposed that the CCP should consider joining the Communist International. Comintern, full name Communist International, was founded in March 1919 by Lenin, with its headquarters in Moscow. The goal was to push for a worldwide proletarian revolution and overthrow capitalist regimes. In 1943, Stalin announced its dissolution during WWII to win over Western allies. The meeting did not formally decide whether to join, but essentially accepted its guidance. Later, Chen Duxiu became the CCP General Secretary, also approved by the Comintern. The CCP was initially very weak, lacking resources and organization. Mao began frequently traveling between Shanghai, Changsha, and Beijing, trying to find a political breakthrough. On one hand, he worked hard in Hunan to preserve the remnants of local political construction; on the other, he began thinking about a wider range of social mobilization schemes. In 1922, the First United Front had not officially started, but the CCP had already begun discussing strategies to infiltrate the Kuomintang. At this time, the KMT was brewing reorganization under Sun Yat-sen's leadership. To seek Soviet aid and expand grassroots strength, Sun Yat-sen was reconsidering his attitude toward the Communist Party and the Soviet Union.

The KMT's Northern Expedition was victorious for half a year from summer to winter. Peasant and worker movements surged, and the CCP's strength rose. The CCP began confiscating land, mobilizing strikes, and attacking old authorities; simultaneously, they called on workers and peasants to resist landlords and capitalists and advocated for worker-peasant organizations to directly manage local power. At that time, Mr. Mao was serving as the Acting Propaganda Head at the KMT Hunan Provincial branch. In July 1926, the National Revolutionary Army set out from Guangzhou for the Northern Expedition and was victorious at every turn; large areas of Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Fujian were quickly liberated. Old warlords fled or surrendered, leaving a political vacuum, especially in rural areas where no one was in charge. Meanwhile, Communist organizations, unions, and peasant associations across the country expanded significantly. Hunan, Jiangxi, and Guangdong were particularly radical, with peasant associations and worker strike groups springing up like mushrooms. There were no officials, no soldiers, and no gentry in local areas, but landlords were still collecting rent, and peasants continued to be exploited. At this time, who would organize the peasants became a huge space.

Around 1925, the CCP started establishing peasant associations in Hunan, Guangdong, and Jiangxi. The earliest peasant associations were mostly pushed by CCP members, Socialist Youth League members, and radical returnees from France. They held night schools, speeches, plays, and slideshows in rural areas, promoting anti-imperialism, anti-feudalism, and rent and interest reduction. It started with educational enlightenment and small-scale agricultural mutual aid societies, then gradually turned toward struggle-oriented organizations. After the Northern Expeditionary Army reached Hunan, Jiangxi, and Hubei, landlords fled, and the Baojia system was paralyzed. The CCP took the opportunity to send large numbers of cadres and peasant movement work teams deep into the countryside, mobilizing the masses to set up peasant associations. Peasant associations were first established in villages with concentrated poor peasants and party member activity, then spread to the surrounding areas. Village peasant associations were established everywhere, electing chairmen, and organizing propaganda teams and pickets, issuing peasant association certificates and swearing unity.

The "Baojia System" is a system that divides peasants into several small groups, letting them manage themselves, monitor each other, and share responsibility. "Jia" is a unit representing 10 households. The most basic level is called "One Jia," where the Jia head is responsible for household registration, conveying government orders, and reporting suspicious figures. Whereas "Bao" is 10 Jias, about 100 households. The Bao head manages all Jias and is responsible to the government; sometimes concurrently handling tax collection, conscripting labor, and seizing grain. There is also "General Bao," a higher level, managing several hundred households, similar to today's "Township Head," coordinating multiple Baos. Jia heads and Bao heads were often local snakes, such as local gentry, landlord agents, or government henchmen. They had authority without checks, colluding with the government for extortion, over-taxing, and embezzling grain. They would catch so-called "chaotic people" and report Communists, stop peasant associations, and suppress lower-class resistance—they were the grip for warlords and the KMT for maintaining stability and suppressing dissidents in the countryside. Because of the collective responsibility mechanism, peasants dared not resist and neighbors dared not help.

After the Baojia system paralyzed, by early 1927, the membership of the Hunan Provincial Peasant Association reached 2 million, with over 10 million people directly mobilizable. In many counties and cities, 90% of peasants had joined the association. Peasant associations began actively seizing landlord property, distributing land, striking at clans, and establishing peasant regimes. In some areas of Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi with good peasant movement foundations, CCP-organized peasant associations began checking fields and distributing land. Their core practices included confiscating the land of major landlords and distributing it to poor peasants or tenants, and confiscating the fields and assets of counter-revolutionary warlords and local gentry. They called for "land to the tiller" and opposed high rents and heavy interest. For confiscated land, the CCP and peasant associations' treatment generally fell into three categories: confiscating and distributing land of local tyrant landlords, while retaining or providing preferential treatment for the land of revolutionary soldiers or supporters. As for the land of small and medium landlords, a portion of rent and tax was collected and handed to the peasant association as funding for the organization. For example, to buy paper, grain, weapons, and propaganda materials. It was also used to establish pickets and peasant self-defense forces to maintain local order and suppress landlords. Meanwhile, they built peasant night schools, literacy education, and other public welfare projects, and established "Poor Peasant Relief Funds" to help destitute peasants through disasters and famines. In March 1927, on the eve of the purge, Mao Zedong wrote the Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan, which was a summary report after his field visits to five counties in Hunan. In April, Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT returned from the Northern Expedition and conducted the April 12 Purge.

7) Chiang Kai-shek (蒋介石)

Chiang Kai-shek was born in 1887 in Xikou, Fenghua, Zhejiang, to a small-town merchant family; his father died early, and he was raised by his mother. In 1906, he entered the Baoding Army Preparatory School, then went to Tokyo Zhenwu School and the Imperial Japanese Army Academy, receiving modern military education. In Japan, he came into contact with the Tongmenghui led by Sun Yat-sen and joined the revolutionary camp. After the Xinhai Revolution broke out in 1911, Mr. Chiang returned to participate in the liberation of Shanghai, after which his military career fluctuated. In 1924, he was appointed by Sun Yat-sen as the commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy, where he gradually formed his own inner circle within the KMT military training system. The "Whampoa Clique" became his power base, and the prototype of "integrating the party and the military" was born there. In 1926, he led the Northern Expeditionary Army, quickly capturing Hunan, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Nanjing, and Shanghai, becoming the most powerful figure within the KMT.

Mr. Chiang received modern Japanese military training in his early years, particularly emphasizing obedience to orders, neat discipline, and organizational efficiency. He advocated for strongman will and authoritative control rather than compromise-based political negotiation or mass autonomy. At Whampoa, he implemented a model where officers were political cadres, transforming political organizations in a militarized way.

Whampoa Military Academy, full name "Republic of China Army Military Academy," was founded by Sun Yat-sen in 1924, with Chiang Kai-shek as commandant, located on Whampoa Island in Guangzhou. The school motto emphasized "Revolution, Loyalty, Sacrifice"; more important than tactics were ideological and political training and absolute loyalty to the leader. Those teaching political classes were not generals, but Communists, including Zhou Enlai, Yun Daiying, and Lin Boqu. Chiang Kai-shek was responsible for military discipline and daily training, gradually establishing his personal authority. In the Whampoa system, an officer had to possess two core qualities: military ability—commanding, fighting, and obeying orders; and political loyalty—absolute loyalty to the Kuomintang, or specifically, to Chiang Kai-shek. This logic was later extended: officers in the National Revolutionary Army had to be KMT members, most high-ranking generals came from Whampoa forming the "Whampoa Clique," and a party-affairs guidance system and spy monitoring mechanism were generally established in the military to ensure "ideological purity."

The so-called "ideological purity" mainly referred to complete identification with KMT ideology, namely unconditional obedience to Chiang Kai-shek’s personal authority, without any "noise" of pro-communism, liberalism, social democracy, or nationalism, and a firm belief in the Three Principles of the People. Whampoa Military Academy opened political classes to spread the Three Principles, Chiang's thoughts, and the party program. Background checks were required for joining the party, promotion, and academy selection, to check for any suspicion of "ideological impurity." There was a snitching system in the military, with spies and informants set up to monitor each other's speech. Once considered "ideologically impure"—for example, dissatisfied with Chiang, in contact with the CCP, or reading "illegal publications"—one would be excluded, demoted, imprisoned, or even killed. This is very similar to the Communist Party's ideological purity; both emphasize ideological unity, with personal loyalty to the organization above all else. Thought is not just internal activity, but a political stance.

Chiang Kai-shek’s model didn't stop at Whampoa but spread through the entire KMT organization. The party affairs system was arranged according to military logic, with vertical leadership from top to bottom and no democratic consultation. Grassroots organizations emphasized orders, execution, and reviews, lacking autonomy. The propaganda system was designed following the military command logic for slogans, movements, and mass mobilization. This militarized political cadre system did, on the one hand, improve execution, discipline, and organizational power in the short term, helping him unify the south and succeed in the Northern Expedition. But it had many problems, such as a lack of political inclusiveness, inability to tolerate dissent, and frequent internal strife; it hindered the institutional development of the political party, leading to severe factions and a lack of oversight; once there was a military failure—like losing the civil war—the political party also collapsed, because the party itself was maintained by the military. This also explains why after 1949, although the KMT existed in Taiwan, it never recovered its political vitality but became an upper-level power group detached from its social base.

The "Central Club" (CC) was founded in 1927 in Nanjing, ostensibly a youth organization to discuss national policies, but in reality, an invisible network for party intelligence, monitoring, mobilization, and appointments. This club was founded by the brothers Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu, Chiang Kai-shek's most loyal civilian cronies, thus called the "CC Clique." The Central Club was not a formal government agency, but it could decide who could join the party, who could be promoted, who should be purged, and what kind of thoughts could be spread. The CC Clique controlled key departments like the KMT Central Organization Department, Personnel Department, and Education Department, appointing heads of party branches at all levels, and also sent commissioners to local areas to "monitor purity." They also controlled media, newspapers, and publications, pushing the "New Life Movement," advocating the "Four Anchors and Eight Virtues" like "cleanliness, propriety, justice, and integrity." They heavily publicized anti-communism, anti-liberalism, and anti-Western thoughts. It turns out that using Confucianism to package totalitarianism came from the Kuomintang.

The founders of the CC Clique, Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu, were known as Mr. Chiang’s left and right hands. Chen Guofu had a stern personality, skilled in rectifying discipline, formulating regulations, and managing the organizational system. Chen Lifu was skilled in propaganda and writing, focusing on the education, ideology, and culture systems. They mastered how to use traditional cultural terms to cover modern political control techniques, packaging personal cult toward Chiang Kai-shek as loyalty, filial piety, benevolence, and righteousness; packaging the purging of dissidents as rectifying party style; and packaging organizational monopoly as unifying thought and the solidarity line. People from this club controlled the KMT's organization, personnel, education, and propaganda departments. They promoted their own people through training, dispatching, and promotion, and set up Central Club branches in various provinces and cities, becoming the local power center. They fully implemented "Party-ized Education" in the education system; university professors had to listen to party training, textbooks had to be reviewed, and they organized many youth military camps and student political seminars to cultivate KMT ideological cadres.

The "New Life Movement" was a national social transformation movement personally launched by Mr. Chiang in 1934, with the goal of rectifying social atmosphere and stabilizing the regime's foundation by emphasizing traditional ethics, life discipline, and moral standards. It was the KMT’s conservative response to social unrest, class antagonism, and the rise of revolutionary thought. In the early 1930s, China was facing the rise of the Communist revolutionary movement, advocating for striking at local tyrants and distributing land; the social atmosphere was chaotic, with drug use, gambling, sex trade, and urban anarchy being common; anti-Japanese sentiment was high, but mass organization was loose, and military morale was low; the KMT regime faced a legitimacy crisis, with poor governance and unstable public support. While Chiang Kai-shek was military "suppressing Communists," he launched this top-down spiritual rectification in culture.

The core slogans of the New Life Movement included "Propriety, Justice, Integrity, and Honor are the Four Anchors of the Nation," and "Loyalty, Filial Piety, Benevolence, Love, Sincerity, Justice, Peace, and Harmony are the Eight Virtues of being a person." Specific requirements included dressing neatly, no exposure, and no bizarre clothes; no spitting in public, no littering, and no mahjong or gambling; being diligent and thrifty, following traffic rules, and no bribery or corruption; discreet behavior between men and women, opposing premarital sex, adultery, and prostitution; opposing laziness, consumerism, and individualism; and within the family, advocating patriarchy, husband's authority, filial piety, and chaste women. Looking at it this way, I have violated all of them except for prostitution.

This seems like moral propaganda, but it was actually the state trying to penetrate into every level of individual body and life. The execution methods at the time included first implementing it in the military, with daily clothing checks and monitoring speech. Then it expanded to schools, with compiled textbooks, lectures, and the establishment of New Life associations. Coordinated with the police system, "New Life Inspectors" were established in cities, with people specifically纠察ing those wearing short skirts, playing mahjong, or men and women hugging, forcibly implementing it.

Although the "New Life Movement" raised the banner of traditional culture, its form was very modern, even somewhat similar to the far-right movements in Europe at the time. It worshiped order, discipline, and the supremacy of the state, detested liberalism and individualism, emphasized collectivism, sacrifice, and purity, and used rituals, slogans, and uniforms to unify the people's consciousness. I can't help but feel ashamed; if I lived back then, how "impure" would I be? No wonder my aunt said I have no "upbringing" (Jiaoyang). In her eyes, I indeed have no upbringing at all. Although I don't quite understand how she can be more "brought up" than me. Because simply saying someone has no upbringing—just because I put my slippers next to the treadmill I brought home—seems to be a behavior with very little "upbringing" as well. Although the New Life Movement did briefly bring a superficial "neatness and cleanliness" to cities, the public generally felt oppressed and annoyed, and underground satirical cartoons and jokes emerged endlessly. This also didn't solve fundamental problems—poverty, corruption, oppression, and social inequality. In sharp contrast was the Communist Party's land reform and mass mobilization in the countryside, where another political possibility appeared.

8) Autumn Harvest Uprising (秋收起义)

In 1927, the five months between the April 12 Purge and the September 9 Autumn Harvest Uprising were actually the most chaotic, painful, and rapidly radicalizing period for the CCP. ChatGPT says I can understand it as a sharp turn from the fantasy of a united front to armed seizure of power. On April 12, 1927, Chiang Kai-shek launched the purge in Shanghai, massacring Communists and leftist organizations. Subsequently, Hunan, Wuhan, Guangzhou, and other places followed suit; unions and peasant associations were banned, and many grassroots core members were arrested and killed. The CCP organizational system quickly collapsed in the cities, and party morale was in chaos. Many didn't understand how the revolution failed so suddenly; they were comrades yesterday but became wanted criminals overnight. The most common emotions during this period were: terror, confusion, anxiety, and hatred. There was a major split within the CCP; everyone was uncertain: stay or fight? The Chen Duxiu faction centered in the Wuhan government advocated for continuing the revolutionary united front, maintaining cooperation with Wang Jingwei, and opposed immediate armed uprising. But he was accused of "right-wing capitulationism" and was removed from the post of General Secretary in July. Meanwhile, the Comintern and people like Zhou Enlai and Qu Qiubai believed they must fight back, advocating for armed revolts across the south. They emphasized that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun"—at this time, it wasn't Mr. Mao who said it, but a consensus gradually forming within the party. This was the beginning of the CCP's shift from propaganda revolution to organizing revolts.

From mid-July, the plans for the Three Great Uprisings were released. The Nanchang Uprising on August 1 was planned by Zhou Enlai, He Long, Ye Ting, and others, considered the CCP's first counter-attack with a military background. They briefly occupied Nanchang but failed 5 days later. The Autumn Harvest Uprising was led by Mr. Mao Zedong, launching a peasant revolt on the Hunan-Jiangxi border with the goal of capturing Changsha. Finally, the Guangzhou Uprising in December was planned by Zhang Tailei and Ye Jianying, the last large-scale urban revolt. All uprisings failed, but Mr. Mao made a turn in his failure. He abandoned the cities, accepted the countryside, and reorganized the military. This was his watershed. Mr. Mao personally experienced the April 12 incident in Shanghai and returned to Hunan after escaping. In May, he published an abridged version of the Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan in the name of the Hunan Provincial Committee. In June-July, he organized the restoration of peasant associations in Xiangtan, Anyuan, and other places, and secretly planned the revolt. In August, he was ordered to establish the Front Committee for the Autumn Harvest Uprising and led the team into the Hunan-Jiangxi border. On September 9, the Autumn Harvest Uprising officially broke out.

The autumn rain had not yet come, but the air on the Hunan-Jiangxi border was already as heavy as a well. On September 9, 1927, the Autumn Harvest Uprising officially broke out. This was a strategic counter-offensive approved by the Central government. Superficially, it had mobilization, a command system, and a roadmap. The goal was to march on Changsha, occupy Hunan, and establish a Soviet. But in reality, this army was just formed, morale was uncertain, and grain and ammunition were not sustained. Mr. Mao Zedong was the secretary of the Front Committee of this team, but he was not a "military head." He was a politician who had written an investigation report, not a general leading a war. And what he led was not an army in the true sense, but a group of peasants, miners, students, and a few off-duty officers. No one knew how long they would fight, where they were going, or how they would win.

The uprising broke out on September 9, 1927, which happened to be the eighth month of the lunar calendar—the time when southern peasants started the autumn harvest. In a China based on an agricultural society, farming seasons were often closely related to political mobilization. When conducting large-scale mobilization and assembly in the countryside, using "Autumn Harvest" as a code name had a protective quality; it looked like an agricultural organization and also a political action. Autumn harvest symbolizes labor, hope, and fruit; in political discourse, it is easily given symbolic meanings like "harvesting the old system and sowing the new revolution." Like later terms such as "Spring Plowing Mobilization" and "Winter Training and Party Rectification," it possessed a farming-style narrative logic in early CCP political propaganda, close to the context of the peasant masses.

In 1927, when the uprising occurred, there was no unified formal title called "Autumn Harvest Uprising"; at the time, it was more commonly called the "Hunan-Jiangxi Border Revolt," "South Hunan Revolt," or "Action to Attack Changsha." The term "Autumn Harvest Uprising" was a phrase established gradually when Mao successfully went up to the Jinggang Mountains and established a base, looking back and summarizing this history. It later became one of the Three Great Uprisings in the CCP’s official party history: Nanchang, Autumn Harvest, and Guangzhou. The command organ of the uprising was approved by the CCP Central Military Department and the Comintern, and Mr. Mao Zedong was appointed as the secretary of the Front Committee. The goal of the uprising was to use the Hunan-Jiangxi border—namely Pingjiang, Liuyang, and Anyuan—as a base to attack Changsha and establish a regime.

Mr. Mao's team was temporarily cobbled together from several directions, including the Pingjiang Worker-Peasant Volunteer Army, a peasant armed force organized by Peng Gongda and others, and the Anyuan Miner Red Guard, the worker armed force most deeply influenced by Mr. Mao. There were also adapted troops from the original National Revolutionary Army, the result of some officers leading their troops to defect. Finally, there were students, local radicals, and marginalized vagrants. The Uprising Committee was set up in Wenjiashi, and the plan was divided into three routes of troops. The East Route, starting from Pingjiang, led by Peng Gongda, mainly worker-peasant armed forces, aiming to enter the North Gate of Changsha. The West Route, starting from Liuyang, led by Mr. Mao Zedong and Lu Deming, mainly composed of Anyuan miners and off-duty soldiers, aiming to enter the East Gate of Changsha. The Middle Route was from Pingxiang, led by Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo, mainly mountain guerrilla forces, attacking the outskirts of Changsha. Radio communication between units was essentially non-existent, relying on messengers for orders. Although Mr. Mao Zedong and Lu Deming nominally commanded the whole situation, they actually only controlled their own route. The training levels among peasants, miners, and guerrillas were extremely inconsistent, and the pace of action was uneven. Various counties and towns had guards, and word had already leaked before the uprising, leading to a passive response to the battle. Thus, monitoring various communication methods must be something a government worried about chaos would focus on; the founder of Telegram has always been under close observation, let alone WeChat and others. There are wrong and unjust cases, but there's no need for excessive tension regarding normal communication—don't quote me.

The uprising troops were originally scheduled to meet and attack the city around September 15, but the Middle and East routes were exposed early and suffered a violent counter-attack by the Hunan warlord Wang Tianpei’s troops. The peasant armed forces on the East route and toward Pingjiang acted earlier, starting on September 9. Yuan Wencai’s unit, due to complex terrain and poor information, also chose to set out early. Due to the lack of radio communication and overall coordination, the result was each fighting its own battle with disorganized timing. Although Mao and Lu Deming wanted to wait for everyone to be together before fighting, they couldn't wait at all before being exposed. Mr. Mao’s main force was blocked east of Changsha due to road problems and failed to enter the outer positions in time. Due to scattered forces, insufficient weapons, and chaotic command, the entire city-attack plan collapsed. On September 19, Mr. Mao decided to withdraw the troops at Wenjiashi. Mr. Mao led the team to retreat to Wenjiashi in Liuyang, Hunan, and held the Wenjiashi Meeting, rejecting the order to continue attacking Changsha. He announced the abandonment of the urban route and moved toward the Luoxiao Mountains, entering the rural mountainous areas. Mr. Mao for the first time broke away from the CCP Central instructions and independently made a military and political decision.

9) Three Great Uprisings (三大起义)

Aside from the Autumn Harvest Uprising, there were also the Nanchang Uprising and the Guangzhou Uprising, which together are called the Three Great Uprisings. This also includes the later Baise Uprising led by Deng Xiaoping and Zhang Yunyi, which is also worth mentioning. These were part of the starting point of the CCP's armed revolution. 1927 was the turning point for the Chinese Communist Party from political cooperation to armed struggle. After the April 12 Purge, the CCP instigated several important uprisings across the country, trying to rebuild its strength from both cities and rural areas. Although most of these uprisings failed, some remnants entered the mountains, starting the guerrilla warfare and base area strategies that formed the prototype of the later Red Army and Soviet areas.

The Nanchang Uprising occurred on August 1, 1927, in Nanchang, Jiangxi. The main generals included Zhou Enlai, He Long, Ye Ting, Zhu De, and Liu Bocheng—these names should be legendary by now. The He Long Stadium in Changsha was also a place where I went to "flip cards" at the City Games as a kid—as for what "flipping cards" specifically is, I'll say another time. This was the CCP's first large-scale armed counter-attack against the purge, and is also the source of the founding anniversary of the People's Liberation Army. But this uprising was not a complete success; the uprising troops briefly occupied Nanchang, were later surrounded and suppressed, and were forced to move south to Chaoshan. The uprising was prepared in haste, and internal opinions were divided. Although superficially the uprising was approved by the CCP Central Military Department and the Comintern, there were obvious internal disagreements. People like Zhou Enlai, Zhang Guotao, and Li Lisan, though agreeing to act, had no full confidence in success. It was originally planned to act on August 1, but it wasn't until the night of July 31 that it was finally determined. Troops were moved overnight, and many grassroots officers and soldiers didn't know what was happening, only being pulled out temporarily to execute orders.

Although the uprising troops controlled Nanchang overnight, they did not form a solid control system. The local administrative system, security system, and logistical supply were not prepared, making it a military explosion of "attacking a city rather than establishing a system." After the uprising, the KMT Nanjing government immediately defined it as a "rebellion" and mobilized troops from Jiangxi, Fujian, and Guangdong to surround Nanchang. This included KMT generals like Li Hanhun, Zhang Fakui, and Han Deqin; a siege quickly formed. Nanchang was inland, not close to the Soviet Union or any possible external aid channels. The CCP's strength in Guangzhou and Wuhan had collapsed and could not form support, and the Comintern failed to timely mobilize other regions to coordinate. Around August 3, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and others decided to "voluntarily withdraw," preparing to move south to Chaoshan to establish a base. In reality, being "surrounded and suppressed" wasn't a total dead end, but a tactical retreat before the enemy's encirclement. But the losses during the process were heavy, and the Chaoshan plan was ultimately not successfully implemented. Brief occupation is useless; many subsequent and peripheral support systems are needed to stabilize the region and coordinate. It's like making a movie. Although the uprising failed, the remnants led by Zhu De and others were preserved, laying the foundation for the later meeting at Jinggang Mountains.

On December 11, 1927, in Guangzhou, Guangdong, Zhang Tailei, Ye Jianying, and Ye Ting led the Guangzhou Uprising, which was an urban uprising. This was also launched under direct Comintern intervention, a mobilization of urban workers. Red flags flew all over Guangzhou for three days and nights, but due to insufficient preparation and isolation, it was quickly suppressed. Zhang Tailei sacrificed his life, and the uprising failed. This battle marked the CCP’s short-term total abandonment of the urban-centered uprising strategy. At that time, there were actually doubts within the CCP about urban uprisings, especially after the failure of the Nanchang and Autumn Harvest uprisings; Mao Zedong and others had already turned to rural guerrilla warfare. But the Comintern insisted that "the proletarian revolution should be completed in the cities," still trying to fight a "revolutionary propaganda battle" in Guangzhou. On the eve of the uprising, Zhang Tailei, Ye Jianying, and Soviet advisors were urgently sent to Guangzhou with the task of organizing the uprising within a few days—it was completely thrown together.

The uprising was secretly planned over just a few days, and preparation was extremely rushed. The main force consisted of worker Red Guards, student volunteers, and some soldiers, totaling fewer than 5,000 people, with crude weapons. There was no unified command system, no solid defense line, and a lack of food and ammunition reserves. At that time, Guangzhou had been recovered by Chiang Kai-shek and was stationed with multiple KMT armies like Zhang Fakui, Li Hanhun, and Xu Chongzhi, with forces far exceeding the rebels. The CCP had basically lost its urban strength in the rest of the country, with no possibility of any reinforcements. Although they quickly occupied most of the city on the day of the uprising, within three days they were surrounded from all sides, with absolutely no external aid. Unlike the mountains, Guangzhou was a transportation hub and a densely populated city, making it easy for the government army to move troops and monitor. There was a lack of widespread support from the masses in the city; although workers had enthusiasm, their fighting experience and combat power were far inferior to the regular army. On the third day of the uprising, it was violently suppressed, Zhang Tailei was shot dead, and Ye Ting’s troops scattered. After the Guangzhou Uprising, the CCP finally reached a consensus to completely abandon the urban-centered uprising route and turn to "surrounding the cities from the countryside." This battle symbolized the end of "urban center revolts" and allowed Mao Zedong's rural route to gradually become dominant.

Zhang Tailei, originally named Zhang Zengrang, from Changzhou, Jiangsu, was born in 1898. He was among the youngest group of early CCP leaders, a Peking University graduate, an active member of the May Fourth Movement, and later studied in the Soviet Union—he was one of the first Chinese students at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow. After returning, he became a person of the "Comintern system"—which was a very important label in the early CCP. He was of the "theoretical school," advocating for urban revolts, and was a "trustworthy young man" in the eyes of the Comintern. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Yun Daiying of the same era all had contact with him, but took different routes. Zhang Tailei chose to stay in the city, believe in the organization, and believe that revolution could be completed by a proletarian assault.

In 1927, the CCP had already suffered continuous heavy blows. But the Comintern was still unwilling to give up on urban revolts. In December, Guangzhou, a city the national government had just "recovered," was chosen as the next stop for the revolution. The executor: Zhang Tailei, 29 years old. He was ordered south to plan the Guangzhou Uprising with Ye Jianying and Ye Ting. The plan was very rushed; from receiving the task to the actual uprising was only a few days. Guangzhou was a major southern town with multiple KMT regiments stationed, far outnumbering the Communist Red Guards. But Zhang Tailei believed that if worker mobilization was successful and "the red flag could fly for three days," it could manufacture international public opinion—at least as a posture.

On December 11, 1927, in the early morning, the uprising began. The red flag really flew over Guangzhou. Zhang Tailei served as the "Chairman of the Guangzhou Soviet Government." He even went to the front line to organize defense personally; it is said he wore civilian clothes, carried a pistol, and hid in a residence to issue orders. On the third day, December 13, Guangzhou was completely surrounded. Zhang Tailei was hit in the abdomen and bled to death on the street. Some say he was shot while covering the retreat, others say he was sacrificed in an ambush. His body was exposed to the sun on the street for three days, and no one dared to collect it. This was the last large-scale uprising in CCP history with the "city as center," and it failed completely. But Zhang Tailei's sacrifice became the "hero story" that the propaganda system was most willing to tell: young, pure, sacrificial, with blood letters, and a martyr's aura. I am not sure if this martyr's aura should be promoted; I do not agree with "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," although I know many Black brothers worship Mr. Mao, but in my view, if war is needed, perhaps people are not yet ready for a natural transition. The Guangzhou Uprising was a typical case directly ordered and facilitated by the Comintern, but the failure exposed the disregard for China's specific national conditions and intensified dissatisfaction within the CCP toward the "listening to Moscow" route.

10) Armed Separatism (武装割据)

On September 19, 1927, Mr. Mao held the Wenjiashi Meeting in Liuyang, Hunan. At this time, the Autumn Harvest Uprising had failed, Changsha was not captured, and troop morale was low. Mr. Mao Zedong held an emergency meeting at Wenjiashi, rejecting the original order to continue attacking Changsha and advocating for abandoning the cities and turning to the mountains. He proposed the goal of transferring toward the Luoxiao Mountains on the Hunan-Jiangxi border to seek a foothold. This was his first time disobeying the military instructions of the CCP Central government. Around September 20, during the transfer, the number of troops plummeted with many deserters. Mr. Mao constantly comforted the soldiers, encouraging them to "preserve strength," advocating that "wherever there is a base area, there is hope." On September 29, the team arrived at Ninggang at the southern foot of the Jinggang Mountains. They settled in the Maoping area of Ninggang County, a border area of Jiangxi, and made contact with a local peasant armed force led by Yuan Wencai.

Yuan Wencai was an important local armed leader during the Jinggang Mountains period after the failure of the Autumn Harvest Uprising; he could be said to be one of the earliest actual controllers of the Jinggang Mountains base. His background was very complex, having both a grassroots peasant temperament and a certain level of military and local governance experience. Born in 1896 in Maoping Village, Ninggang, Jiangxi, to a poor peasant family, his early life was difficult. He had worked as a hunter locally and was forced to join a bandit gang, and also briefly participated in the Northern Expeditionary Army, giving him basic military literacy. Later, he established himself as a "Greenwood" (outlaw hero) armed leader in the Ninggang area, controlling Maoping and Jingzhu Mountain, actually controlling the entire southern foot of the Jinggang Mountains. In October 1927, when Mr. Mao led the remnants of the Autumn Harvest Uprising to Ninggang, he met Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo, another mountain armed leader. Yuan initially held a wait-and-see attitude toward Mao, but eventually accepted Mao’s political advocacy and agreed to jointly establish the Jinggang Mountains base. Mr. Mao relied on Yuan’s territory and mass base to settle down. Yuan’s troops became an important part of the Jinggang Mountains "Worker-Peasant Revolutionary Army."

In early 1930, the CCP Jiangxi Provincial Committee sent someone to lure and kill Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo on the grounds that they were "arrogant and domineering," "did not follow orders," and "might defect to the enemy." The actual reason was very likely related to factional struggle and the Central government's suspicion toward local warlord-style armed forces. Again, participating in politics requires caution; human life is at stake. Freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, fairness in law enforcement, and the reasonableness of sentencing for the subjects of law enforcement do not belong in this scope—I'm talking about actual war. After Yuan's death, Mr. Mao did not publicly seek justice for him, and his role was gradually downplayed in party history until recently when some scholars and local chronicles brought up his contributions again. Yuan Wencai represented the complexity of local armed separatism in the early stages of the Chinese revolution. He wasn't a typical Communist, but it was precisely such figures—from bandits to peasants to revolutionaries—who constituted the soil for the CCP's early survival and development. As mentioned before, there were Beiyang warlords, jobless vagrants, peasants, and returned students—everything. That era was a mess, so think about how now is nothing. Stability and peace still need to be maintained, and they are very hard to maintain, but those basic freedoms should be guaranteed in a peaceful country, otherwise, what's the point of such peace. Now China and the US are at each other's throats every day, making everyone very anxious. But in short, without Yuan Wencai's acceptance, Mr. Mao would likely have found it hard to establish a foothold in the Jinggang Mountains.

After settling in the Jinggang Mountains area, Mr. Mao reached a preliminary alliance with Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo. He began to reorganize the troops, proposing the concept of the "First Regiment of the First Division of the Worker-Peasant Revolutionary Army." He conducted the reorganization at Sanwan in Yongxin, Jiangxi, proposing some principles, such as "establishing party branches at the company level" and "equality between officers and soldiers" and "the military serving the masses." Although I don't know how it was executed specifically, I feel that if one is voluntarily fighting in such a war and still lacks equality, I fear even fewer people would follow. The reason so many joined was likely that they felt they weren't being treated unfairly—leaving a job is nothing more than either too little money or being treated unfairly, it's the same logic.

In late October, Mr. Mao established a preliminary base and began armed separatism, striking at local tyrants and distributing land, establishing mass organizations, and began trying to use the Jinggang Mountains as the center of the base area to coordinate external uprising and guerrilla activities, such as in South Hunan and South Jiangxi. "Armed Separatism" refers to using one's own armed forces in a certain geographical area to "cut" that area out from the control of the central government or hostile forces, establishing independent military and political rule as a base area. This is one of the core concepts of Mr. Mao's strategy of surrounding the cities from the countryside. They would station troops and set up regimes, such as the "Worker-Peasant Revolutionary Government" in the Jinggang Mountains. And they began to expel or suppress hostile forces, like local officials, landlord armed forces, and the White Army. Simultaneously, they developed local mass organizations, grasping control over security, land, justice, and taxes. This wasn't just guerrilla warfare, but "territorialization"—building one's own regime based on military force.

Striking at local tyrants and distributing land was one of the CCP's fundamental strategies for mobilizing the masses and winning peasant support. The so-called "Local Tyrants" (Tuhao) were those in the landlord class with strong economic power, close ties to the government, and heavy oppression of peasants. Striking at local tyrants meant depriving them of their land and property. It is said the specific practices included searching homes and settling accounts, turning the tyrants' land, grain, and property over to the public or distributing them. They held mass struggle meetings, organizing poor peasants to "struggle against" landlords or rich peasants, sometimes accompanied by humiliation, detention, or even lynching. Simultaneously, they distributed land to poor peasants, claiming "land to the tiller." Meanwhile, they eliminated patriarchal forces, dismantling clan power, ancestral halls, and the rural religious and sacrificial systems controlled by landlords.

Zhu De, born in 1886 in Yilong, Sichuan, came from a Qing Dynasty Xiucai background and served as a general in the Yunnan Army in his early years. Later, he went to Germany to study military science and came into contact with the Comintern after returning. In 1927, he participated in the Nanchang Uprising and led his troops south after the failure, moving through South Jiangxi and South Hunan. In April 1928, he and Chen Yi met with Mr. Mao in the Ninggang area of Jiangxi. After the meeting, the Fourth Army of the Worker-Peasant Red Army was established, with him as the Commander-in-Chief. His official title after the founding of the People's Republic of China was Commander-in-Chief of the People's Liberation Army and Marshal. Reference materials include The Biography of Zhu De, A Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party, and Selected Historical Materials of the Jinggang Mountains Revolutionary Base.

Chen Yi, born in 1901 in Lezhi, Sichuan, once went to France for work-study programs and joined the revolution after returning. After the Nanchang Uprising in 1927, he joined Zhu De's troops and became a core political work member. He traveled with Zhu De and went up to the Jinggang Mountains in April 1928 to meet with Mr. Mao. After the founding of New China, he served as Foreign Minister, Vice Premier, and Marshal. There are many biographies and selected works, such as Selected Poems of Chen Yi, Chronicle of Chen Yi, and The Biography of Chen Yi. Around April 28, 1928, Zhu De, Chen Yi, and Mr. Mao led their troops to a victorious meeting at Ninggang, and then reorganized into the Fourth Army of the Chinese Worker-Peasant Red Army, with Zhu De as Commander-in-Chief and Mr. Mao as the Party Representative, formally forming the early dual-track system of CCP military and political leadership.