Building Autonomy Requires Central-Local Collaboration

6-3: Experiments in Provincial Autonomy

The "Drive Out Zhang" Movement (qu Zhang yundong) erupted in the summer of 1920, targeting Zhang Jingyao, a Beiyang warlord who had been appointed as military governor of Hunan in 1918. By then, Mao Zedong had not yet joined the Chinese Communist Party. He emerged in this period as a radical local intellectual and reformist, organizing student strikes, business shutdowns, and mass demonstrations. In November 1920, under mounting local pressure, Zhang was forced to leave Hunan, reassigned by the Beiyang government. For Mao, this marked his first taste of mass mobilization—and its power to pressure authority from the grassroots.

Zhang's departure created a brief political vacuum. His successor, Zhao Hengti, though still part of the Beiyang clique, was comparatively pragmatic and moderate. A native of Ningxiang, Hunan, Zhao was a former Qing scholar who had studied law in Japan and held several legal and administrative posts under the Beiyang regime—including provincial governor and Minister of Justice—before becoming Hunan's military governor. While affiliated with the northern warlords, Zhao belonged to a more technocratic and locally rooted stratum, distinct from the Anhui or Zhili military cliques.

In this atmosphere, Hunan's intellectuals, students, and business leaders seized the moment, pushing for local reform and autonomy from Beijing's warlord rule. Similar trends emerged across southern provinces, but Hunan's movement was the most radical, with Mao as one of its vocal advocates.

In early 1921, Mao founded and edited the journal Xiangjiang Review (Xiangjiang Pinglun), calling for "Hunanese rule over Hunan." He denounced the Beiyang warlords as "distant in Beijing, ignorant of Hunan's suffering" and argued for a provincial legislature elected by the people to implement local autonomy. Collaborating with his mentor and father-in-law Yang Changji, linguist Li Jinxi, and reformer Xie Juezai, Mao helped draft a preliminary version of the Hunan Provincial Constitution. This draft envisioned a locally elected assembly, a provincial executive (zhishi), independent finances, and educational self-governance. Today, such a proposal might be likened to pro-independence movements in Hong Kong or Taiwan, but in the early 1920s, with no internet or cancel culture, these ideas found echoes across many provinces.

This resonates with a long-standing personal belief: that China, rather than being a single "People's Republic," has historically functioned more like a "United Provinces of China." From firsthand observation, each province operates as a semi-autonomous cultural and administrative entity, with vast differences in language, custom, law enforcement, and governance.

Compared to today's highly centralized provincial administrations, the 1921 Hunan Draft Constitution envisioned a proto-federalist structure, with local control over tax, education, and administration. Mao, still a reformist at this stage, entertained visions of decentralized governance—a stark contrast to the hyper-centralism he later came to embody. This raises the question: Could China have achieved genuine local governance reform without a violent revolution?

6-4: The Hunan Draft Constitution and Constitutional Dreams

The full text of the "Hunan Provincial Constitution" is no longer readily accessible, but its drafting process is mentioned in Zhang Qianfan's book Constitutional Essentials (Xianzheng Changshi).

In a September 3, 1920 essay titled "The Root Problem of Hunan's Reconstruction Is the Reconstruction of Political Power," Mao wrote:

"A common fallacy of the past was that only great powers could survive in the modern world. This notion fed imperialism, crushed minority nationalities, and turned semi-civilized peoples into slaves. Britain, America, Germany, France, Russia, and Austria all followed this path, though none truly succeeded. China fared worse—not even a false success. What it achieved was the extinction of the Manchus, and the slow death of the Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans. The 18 provinces are in chaos, ruled by warlords, with three governments, three parliaments, over twenty warlord-kings, and constant killings. The so-called Republic has few citizens who understand what a republic actually means."

I resonate with this logic, though I struggle to understand why Mao later strayed so far from it. The historical documents are not easily accessible outside mainland China. Based on academic reconstructions, the Hunan Draft Constitution likely included the following elements:

• Provincial Assembly System: All men aged 21 and above were granted suffrage. Provincial legislators were elected via grassroots ballots, and the legislature was empowered to draft local laws, approve budgets, and oversee administrative conduct.

• Direct Election of Provincial Head (Zhishi): Abolishing Beijing-appointed military governors, the zhishi would be elected by the people and accountable to the provincial legislature. Legal procedures and recall mechanisms would ensure public oversight.

• Fiscal and Educational Autonomy: Hunan would retain its tax revenues rather than remit them to central warlords. The provincial assembly would approve budgets, and local education authorities would devise curricula, compile textbooks, and promote vernacular education and practical knowledge.

• Basic Rights and Civil Liberties: The constitution guaranteed freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association. The military was to remain under civilian oversight. Civil society groups like labor unions and student associations were encouraged to participate in governance.

Following Zhao Hengti's appointment, many local politicians and intellectuals submitted reform proposals, calling for an elected assembly and fiscal independence. Linguist Li Jinxi, for instance, promoted vernacular literacy. Zhao did not immediately suppress these ideas; he even encouraged pilot programs and investigations, leaving space for constitutional discussion. It was in this ambiguous atmosphere that Mao, Li, and Xie proposed the draft constitution.

The Xiangjiang Review, launched in May 1921 in Changsha, openly advocated slogans like "Hunanese Rule Over Hunan" and denounced Beijing's centralized warlordism. Had Zhao opposed this from the outset, he could have shut it down under charges of threatening national unity. But he allowed it to operate for months—a political signal in itself. Zhao, educated in Japan and once Justice Minister, likely understood and partly sympathized with constitutionalist ideals. However, his priority was bureaucratic order and stability, not radical reform.

6-5: The Beiyang Central Government's Crackdown

Beijing's Beiyang regime, led by Duan Qirui and Cao Kun, was fundamentally a military junta. It rejected provincial legislatures and electoral government, fearing a slippery slope toward federalism and local separatism. The central government quickly censored the Xiangjiang Review, ordered Zhao to clamp down on radicals, and deployed troops to intimidate Changsha—sending a clear message that autonomy would not be tolerated.

New civic groups promoting self-governance—such as the Hunan Constitutional Research Society and the Autonomy Promotion Association—were banned. Zhao ordered the closure of their offices, the dispersal of student and youth organizations, and the secret interrogation or expulsion of their leaders.

While outwardly preserving a veneer of reform, Zhao installed loyal moderates in key posts, sidelining the radicals. He reorganized local educational boards and curriculum commissions, marginalizing Mao and Li Jinxi. In joint telegrams with Beijing, he labeled Mao's faction as "provincial separatists" and "disruptors of national unity," politically isolating them.

Within the movement, three camps emerged:

• The Radical Faction, led by Mao, Cai Hesen, Xie Juezai, and Li Weihan—young intellectuals influenced by the New Culture Movement and international socialism. They supported mass mobilization, universal suffrage, peasant associations, workers' unions, vernacular literacy, and anti-feudal reform.

• The Moderate Reformists, or "cultural liberals," including Yang Changji (Mao's father-in-law), Li Jinxi, Zhang Shizhao, Ren Bishi, and He Shuheng—educators advocating gradual reform, constitutional institutions, and educational modernization. They favored autonomy but rejected violent revolution. I suspect I would’ve aligned with this camp had I lived in that era.

• The Gentry Faction, composed of landlords, local elites, and business guilds. They valued stability and tolerated limited reforms but opposed mass mobilization. Though they initially supported autonomy to escape central control, they quickly sided with Beijing once pressure mounted.

Mao sought grassroots upheaval. Li Jinxi pursued cultural sovereignty. The gentry simply wanted Beijing out without sacrificing local dominance. These divergent agendas could not be unified into a single institutional project. Under pressure from Zhao and Beijing, the movement fragmented and collapsed like loose sand.