Disclaimer：为了防止煽动，我不提供结论，只提供史事和观点，欢迎fact check。但我的私人区(essays/private)，不是评论，全是情绪、完全不客观、慎重进入。
6-0: 北伐时期的国民党湖南省党部 代理宣传部长
我好奇毛先生在国民党的时候，具体是负责什么的，果不其然，是宣传部部长、虽然是代理的。这应该是他饭碗里的工作，他会读书、会写诗、会写文章，在宣传“新思想”方面很有煽动能力，也让很多知识分子觉得自己深深地被理解。宣传部长，用现在的话说，就是负责propaghanda的。我想我身体里也有他的一些基因，我这么会，原来也是跟老人们学的。
在这之前，毛先生在湖南已经是地方活跃分子。他1920年创办文化书社，在长沙五一路的一个二层小楼里。现在五一路也还是老城区的市中心，虽然这栋楼已经不在，但可以想象到当时的繁荣。这个文化社，对外叫文化社，但实际上，对内是革命组织的据点。我记得在很久之前看的《十月围城》里，有展现靠出版社当掩护、实际是革命据点的操作在当时非常普遍，共产党、兴中会都这么干。
文化书社通过销售《新青年》《共产党宣言》《马克思传》《社会主义史》等书，传播马克思思想、民主思想、反军阀思潮。他写传单、标语、小册子，开讲座，搞“平民夜校”，教工人、贫民读书识字。这是极好的事情，except我不确定毛先生是真的想他们识字、可以做出自己的判断，还是为了方便他煽动革命。我很怀疑毛先生的所谓“觉醒”是否是真的觉醒。看起来，只是给自己推翻强权的理由，目的还是自己掌握权利。毕竟掌权之前的约定，在新中国成立之后，没有兑现，还在“实践中”造成比军阀更糟糕的影响。
6-1: 湖南军阀张敬尧
很多北洋军阀是安徽人，当时的湖南的权利掌握者张敬尧也不例外，是袁世凯旧部、北洋军阀重的“皖系军阀”。就好像现在党内也很多派系，之前也一样。他早期在清朝陆军中任职，后来投靠“皖系”首领段祺瑞，1918年被任命为“湖南督军”，也就是军区司令和地方最高行政长官，军权、政权一体。虽然张敬尧的统治时间才两年，但因为在当地反复收税、重复征粮，在本地臭名昭著。他任命亲信当地方官僚，控制湖南全境，镇压学生运动、罢工罢课，不惜开抢。嗜酒如命，公开霸占女学生。对外软弱，屈从日本人对湖南的经济掠夺，对内却把地方当私人资产、横镇暴敛。毛先生想要推翻他，他开始了“驱张运动”。
毛先生手上没抢，他知道自己的资本是话语权、青年人和社会影响力。他开始动员学生、工人、商人、教师，开始撰写并且散发大量反张文章、小册子、传单，列出“驱张六罪”：贪污纳贿、压榨民众、镇压学生、出卖民族利益、对付妇女侮辱、暂居湖南不肯撤军。这些情况到现在、也还存在，只是不同人、不同地方、不同方式。毛先生的宣传资料，是在讲道理，但也在制造愤怒，提供合法性框架。他说这人不好，那你得说说，你具体有什么操作办法？怎么操作？打算怎么做？你把你的计划拿出来，给全民公投啊。怎么还是你说了算，还是“自上而下”。
我想这就是为什么每次发动什么“革命”、什么“运动”，他总是需要给自己找合理性。他觉得这样，就使自己不同。革命如果不是大家自发的、自然而然的产生的，战争的、强制的、暴力的形式，恐怕不你多么宏大的理由，都给你以为帮助的人没有起到多大帮助。这点我最近深有感悟。他有他的思想，我有我的思想，别人有别人的思想。管你什么思想、一人一句，一起商量。“自上而下”，甚至“间接选举”，“议会制度”都不是直接民主。这些“间接民主”，wiggle room还挺大。现在各种系统这么rigged，很多问题解决不了。你要说某些人没占着茅坑不拉屎，我有点难以相信。这放在全世界都一样，不针对具体国家。
6-2: “驱张运动”
毛先生在北伐时期，是以共产党的身份在国民党湖南省党部，任代理宣传部长。他获得这个职位，是因为1923年时，孙中山提出“联俄、联共、扶助农工”，开始国共合作。苏联推动中共党员以“个人身份加入国民党”，国民党为了加强基层动员，也接受中共人才在地方党部任职。当时中央政府已经完全失能，北洋军阀袁世凯控制北京，各地军阀割据、老百性苦不堪言。孙中山在广州搞“护法运动”，但几次北伐都失败，根本打不过北洋军队。国民党，缺兵、缺钱、缺地盘，党内分裂严重，面对北洋军阀、外国列强只能采取联合共产党、俄国和扶助农工的方式，强大自己。
1917年，苏联刚成立，想输出革命、需要在东方找盟友。西方列强都排斥孙中山，认为他是反秩序的激进分子。苏联主动接触国民党，提供军事顾问、训练支持、资金援助。孙中山打算借助共产党带动基层，但有国民党掌权，这也是第一次国共合作的基础。
毛先生利用自己在第一师范的影响力，组织长沙各高校联合罢课、游行、情愿，成立“长沙学生联合会”，拉动全省响应。不仅如此，他还拉拢湖南商会、工商界，组织“罢市”，制造地方经济压力。他的群众路线，不是只靠穷人，而是借矛盾统一的不同阶层的利益诉求。他将湖南民众的清泉材料、驱张文宣送到北京，借《民国日报》等进步报纸传播湖南现状，施压北洋政府。当时，北洋内部 “皖系”、直系正在内斗，毛先生知道张敬尧是“皖系”，搞臭他正好方便中央撤他的职。看到这里，我深刻理解到毛先生体内的反动基因，他的组织能力、宣传能力、带动能力、制造混乱的能力都很强。这到底是为什么？是湘人的本能吗？我正在深刻反省。
Notes for Non-Chinese Readers:
Zhang Jingyao (张敬尧): A Beiyang warlord affiliated with the Anhui Clique (皖系军阀), Zhang served as the military governor of Hunan (湖南) from 1918 to 1920. His rule was notorious for corruption, over-taxation, violent suppression of dissent, and personal misconduct. He became the main target of the Expel Zhang Movement led by Mao.
Acting position (代理): In Chinese political terminology, an “acting” role indicates a temporary, often unofficial appointment. Mao was the “acting head of propaganda” in the Hunan KMT branch—meaning low formal rank but enough room to operate and influence.
New Thought (新思想): A term used during the May Fourth era to describe emerging ideas such as democracy, science, socialism, and anti-feudalism. It represented a break from Confucian orthodoxy and fueled revolutionary consciousness.
Bodyguards and Assassins (《十月围城》): A 2009 Hong Kong historical drama that depicts revolutionaries in late Qing China using bookstores and publishing houses as fronts for political organizing. Reflects a common tactic used by underground movements, including the early CCP.
Wuyi Road, Changsha (长沙五一路): A central street in downtown Changsha (长沙), historically a hub for political, commercial, and intellectual activity. Mao’s Culture Book Society (文化书社) was located here in the early 1920s.
Night schools for the poor (平民夜校): Educational programs held in the evenings to teach literacy and basic knowledge to workers and peasants. Often organized by progressive intellectuals, they also served as grassroots platforms for political mobilization.
Anhui Province (安徽): A province in eastern China, home to many military officers of the Anhui Clique. It played a major role in the early Beiyang government’s power struggles during the Republican period.
Anhui Clique (皖系): One of the key factions within the Beiyang government, led by Duan Qirui (段祺瑞). The clique advocated centralized control and aligned itself with Japanese interests. It was in constant rivalry with the Zhili and Fengtian Cliques.
Duan Qirui (段祺瑞): A leading figure in early Republican China and head of the Anhui Clique. He served multiple terms as Premier and was considered the power behind the Beiyang regime’s militarized politics.
Japanese economic penetration in Hunan (当时日本对湖南的经济掠夺): During Zhang Jingyao’s tenure, Japanese businesses and banks gained control over key infrastructure, mining rights, and financial markets in Hunan through unequal agreements with local warlords, causing widespread resentment.
Expel Zhang Movement (驱张运动): A 1920 grassroots political campaign in Hunan, led by Mao Zedong and other students, workers, and merchants, to force the removal of warlord Zhang Jingyao. It was Mao’s first large-scale organizing effort and a precursor to his later emphasis on mass mobilization and peasant revolution.
Disclaimer
To avoid incitement, I offer no conclusions. Only historical facts and conflicting perspectives. Feel free to fact-check. However, the “essays” section is very emotional, entirely subjective. Enter that section with caution.
6.0: Propaganda, Power, and Early Patterns
I was curious what exactly Mr. Mao was doing during his time in the Kuomintang. As it turns out, he was appointed as acting head of propaganda for the Hunan Provincial KMT Committee. Acting, which means temporary and not officially empowered. Still, propaganda was his job. He knew how to read, write poetry, compose essays. He had an instinctive feel for rhetoric. When promoting “new thought” (新思想), he made many intellectuals feel deeply understood. To be in charge of propaganda is to shape emotional reality. In modern terms, he was managing ideological narrative. I think some of that ability lives in my body too. Maybe this persuasive instinct, this hunger to shape language, came from the old ones.
Before this, Mao was already an active figure in Hunan. In 1920, he founded the Culture Book Society (文化书社) in a two-story building on Wuyi Road, in the heart of downtown Changsha (长沙五一路). The building is gone, but I can still picture the rhythm of that street, its noise and anxiety. Publicly, it was a bookstore. Privately, it functioned as a revolutionary base. I recall seeing something like this in the film Bodyguards and Assassins (《十月围城》), where bookstores were used as political fronts. It was a common tactic at the time, used by both the Communists and other revolutionary groups like the Revive China Society.
The Culture Book Society sold titles such as New Youth, The Communist Manifesto, and The Biography of Marx. These were not just books, they were weapons. They carried democratic ideals, anti-warlord sentiment, and socialist theory into the public. Mao printed leaflets, wrote slogans, ran night schools for the poor (平民夜校), and taught workers to read. That sounds noble. Except I am not sure he truly wanted them to think for themselves. Sometimes I wonder if literacy was a means to an end, a step toward easier mobilization. I question whether Mao’s so-called awakening was ever really about awakening others. It seems more like he needed a reason to overthrow power, and the real goal was to claim it for himself. The promises made before power was seized were never fulfilled. What came later often made things worse than they were under the warlords.
6.1: Zhang Jingyao, the Enemy Who Made Mao Useful
Like many of the Beiyang warlords, Zhang Jingyao (张敬尧) was from Anhui Province (安徽). He belonged to the Anhui Clique (皖系) and was aligned with Duan Qirui (段祺瑞), the faction’s leader. In 1918, Zhang was appointed military governor of Hunan. This gave him full control over both military and administrative affairs. His rule lasted two years and left behind a legacy of violence, greed, and fear. He imposed endless taxes, demanded grain, suppressed student protests, fired live rounds into strikes. He drank heavily. He openly abused female students. He made deals with Japanese interests, handing over resources and infrastructure while treating the local population as if they were his property. Mao wanted him gone, and so began the Expel Zhang Movement (驱张运动).
Mao had no guns. What he did have was language, youth, and social leverage. He mobilized students, workers, merchants, and teachers. He wrote and distributed a flood of articles, pamphlets, and leaflets listing six crimes: corruption, oppression, suppression of youth, betrayal of national interests, sexual misconduct, and refusal to step down. These crimes still exist. Different names, different places, different faces. Mao was not just making a case. He was stoking anger. He was creating a framework for legitimacy. He pointed and said, this man is unfit. But what was his plan? What came after? What was the process? Where was the vote? Nothing about it was participatory. It was top-down.
That is the pattern. Every time he launched a revolution or a movement, he needed a story. He needed to believe this time was different. But if a revolution is not born from the people, if it is imposed by violence, then no matter how noble the story sounds, it often fails the ones it claims to serve. I have been thinking about this a lot. He had his philosophy. I have mine. Everyone else has theirs. One person, one voice. Why not talk it out? Representative systems, indirect elections, parliamentary procedures—these are not direct democracy. Indirect democracy leaves space for manipulation. These systems are rigged. That is why some problems never get solved. When people say that those in power sit on their hands and do nothing, I cannot fully disagree. It happens everywhere. This is not about any particular country.
6.2: The Movement That Gave Mao His First Real Victory
By the time of the Expel Zhang Movement, Mao was still serving within the Kuomintang. His post as acting head of propaganda came under the 1923 policy of “Alliance with Russia, alliance with the Communist Party, and support for workers and peasants” (联俄、联共、扶助农工), initiated by Sun Yat-sen. This marked the First United Front between the KMT and CCP. Soviet advisors encouraged Communists to join the KMT as individuals, and the KMT accepted them to strengthen its grassroots capacity. At that time, the central government had collapsed. The Beiyang regime controlled Beijing, and warlords ruled the rest. Sun Yat-sen tried and failed to launch the Northern Expedition from Guangzhou. The KMT was divided, underfunded, and underarmed. It had to turn to the Soviets and the CCP for help.
Mao knew how to organize. Using his influence from First Normal School, he mobilized students from across Changsha into strikes and protests. He helped form the Changsha Students’ Union and expanded the campaign to neighboring cities. He brought in the business community too—merchants, industrialists, chambers of commerce. His version of the mass line did not rely only on the poor. He aligned different classes through shared frustration. He sent petitions to Beijing. He used progressive newspapers like The Republican Daily to expose Zhang’s crimes. He knew that internal rivalries within the Beiyang regime could be weaponized. Zhang was part of the Anhui Clique. Discrediting him was politically convenient. Mao used the moment well.
Reading this history again, I see clearly that Mao’s instinct was not just revolutionary. It was counter-systemic. He could organize, manipulate, build momentum, and generate disruption. And he did it with precision. I find myself wondering—why? Is this a Hunanese trait?