The Three Major Uprisings of 1927

9-3: The Nanchang Uprising

In addition to the Autumn Harvest Uprising, two other major uprisings took place around the same time: the Nanchang Uprising and the Guangzhou Uprising. These three are collectively referred to as the “Three Major Uprisings.” The Baise Uprising, led later by Deng Xiaoping and Zhang Yunyi, is also worth mentioning. Together, these uprisings marked the beginning of the Chinese Communist Party’s armed revolution.

1927 was a turning point for the CCP, shifting from political cooperation to armed struggle. After the April 12 purge, the Party launched several key uprisings across the country, attempting to rebuild its strength from both urban and rural fronts. Although most of these uprisings failed, some remnants managed to retreat into the mountains, initiating guerrilla warfare and the creation of rural base areas—the early seeds of the Red Army and future Soviet zones.

The Nanchang Uprising broke out on August 1, 1927, in Nanchang, Jiangxi—hence the name. The main commanders included Zhou Enlai, He Long, Ye Ting, Zhu De, and Liu Bocheng—names that should ring loud and clear to most. (The He Long Sports Stadium in Changsha is named after him. I remember going there as a kid during the City Games to “flip name cards,” whatever that really meant—story for another day.) This was the CCP’s first large-scale armed retaliation following the purge and later became the symbolic founding day of the People’s Liberation Army. But the uprising was not a full success. The rebel forces briefly took Nanchang, only to be encircled and forced to retreat south to the Chaozhou-Shantou region.

The preparation was rushed, and internal disagreements ran deep. On the surface, the uprising had the backing of the Central Military Commission and Comintern, but within the Party, opinions varied. Leaders like Zhou Enlai, Zhang Guotao, and Li Lisan agreed to move forward but were far from confident about success. The original plan was to act on August 1, but the final decision wasn’t made until the night of July 31. Troops were redeployed overnight, with many rank-and-file soldiers having no idea what was going on—they were simply ordered to carry out commands.

The forces managed to take Nanchang overnight, but failed to establish any real control. There was no administrative framework, no security system, no logistical support—this was more of a smash-and-grab than any attempt to build new governance. The Nanjing government quickly labeled the uprising as a rebellion and mobilized forces from Jiangxi, Fujian, and Guangdong to encircle the city. Commanders like Li Hanhun, Zhang Fakui, and Han Deqin led a swift response. Nanchang, being an inland city, had no access to Soviet support or any external aid. The Party’s urban bases in Guangzhou and Wuhan had already collapsed, and Comintern failed to coordinate reinforcements from elsewhere.

Around August 3, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De decided on a “voluntary withdrawal,” preparing to move south to establish a new base in Chaozhou. In truth, the so-called “encirclement” was not total disaster, but rather a tactical retreat before the noose tightened. Still, the losses were heavy, and the Chaozhou plan ultimately fell through. A brief occupation was meaningless without follow-up support and coordination—it’s a bit like filmmaking: capturing the scene is one thing, but post-production and distribution are everything.

Though the uprising failed, the surviving troops, under Zhu De and others, would eventually regroup and pave the way for the future convergence at Jinggangshan.

9-4: The Guangzhou Uprising

On December 11, 1927, in Guangzhou, Zhang Tailei, Ye Jianying, and Ye Ting led the Guangzhou Uprising—a city-based insurrection launched under direct orders from the Comintern. It was an urban mobilization of workers. Red flags waved across the city for three days and nights, but due to poor preparation and complete isolation, it was quickly crushed. Zhang Tailei was killed. The uprising failed. This marked the CCP’s decisive break from its short-lived strategy of urban insurrection.

By that time, the CCP already had serious doubts about urban uprisings—especially after the failures in Nanchang and the Autumn Harvest. Mao Zedong had turned to rural guerrilla warfare. But Comintern still insisted that “proletarian revolution must be completed in cities,” and pushed for one more “revolutionary showcase” in Guangzhou. Zhang Tailei, Ye Jianying, and Soviet advisors were urgently dispatched just days before the uprising. Everything was cobbled together at the last minute.

The planning was done in a matter of days. It was incredibly rushed. The main forces were worker militias, student volunteers, and a few scattered soldiers—less than 5,000 in total, poorly armed. There was no unified command, no solid defenses, and almost no food or ammo. Guangzhou had already been taken back by Chiang Kai-shek. The city was garrisoned by Nationalist generals like Zhang Fakui, Li Hanhun, and Xu Chongzhi, with far superior forces. The CCP had lost nearly all urban bases elsewhere—no reinforcements could be expected. On the first day, the rebels managed to seize most of the city, but within three days, they were surrounded with no way out.

Unlike the mountains, Guangzhou was a transport hub with dense population and easy government surveillance. The rebels lacked broad popular support. While the workers had revolutionary zeal, their combat experience was no match for professional troops. On the third day, the uprising was brutally suppressed. Zhang Tailei was shot dead. Ye Ting’s troops scattered.

After Guangzhou, the Party reached internal consensus: abandon urban uprisings and focus on “encircling the cities from the countryside.” This marked the death of the urban insurrection strategy and the rise of Mao’s rural path.

Zhang Tailei—originally Zhang Zengrang—was born in Changzhou, Jiangsu, in 1898. He was one of the youngest early CCP leaders, a Peking University graduate, an active participant in the May Fourth Movement, and later a student at Moscow’s Oriental University, part of the first cohort of Chinese trainees. After returning to China, he became part of the “Comintern faction”—a critical label in the Party’s early days.

He was a “theory man,” a believer in urban revolution, a Comintern favorite. His contemporaries like Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Yun Daiying knew him, but took different paths. Zhang stayed in the cities, trusted the organization, and believed revolution could be triggered by the proletariat.

By 1927, the CCP had suffered repeated blows: the April purge, the August Nanchang failure, the September Autumn Harvest failure… but Comintern still clung to the urban uprising model. In December, Guangzhou—just “reclaimed” by the Nationalists—was chosen as the next revolutionary stage. Executor: Zhang Tailei, 29 years old. He was ordered south to plan the uprising with Ye Jianying and Ye Ting. From receiving the order to execution, there were just a few days. Guangzhou was a major southern city, packed with Nationalist troops. Zhang believed if they could raise the red flag for three days, international attention might follow—even if just symbolically.

December 11, 1927, at dawn, the uprising began. The red flag did fly over Guangzhou. Zhang served as “Chairman of the Guangzhou Soviet Government.” He reportedly led defenses in plain clothes with a pistol, issuing orders from inside civilian homes. On the third day, December 13, the city was completely surrounded. Zhang was shot in the abdomen and bled out in the street. Some say he died covering a retreat, others say he was ambushed. His body lay exposed for three days—no one dared retrieve it.

This was the last large-scale, city-centered uprising in CCP history—a complete failure. But Zhang’s death became a favorite story in the Party’s later propaganda: young, pure, sacrificial, with blood-written oaths and martyr spirit. I’m not sure this kind of martyrdom should be celebrated. I don’t believe power should come from the barrel of a gun. I know many folks, even in the West, worship Mao. But in my view, if you still need war to change regimes, maybe society just isn’t ready yet.

The Guangzhou Uprising was a textbook case of Comintern micromanagement. Its failure revealed a deep ignorance of China’s real conditions—and pushed the CCP to rethink its loyalty to Moscow.