Armed Separatism: The Communist Party Began as Outlaws

Preface: The image in this article is propaganda art, not an actual historical photograph. Also, I have some doubts about the source of this particular historical account—hopefully it’s reliable. Fact-checking is welcome.

9-1: Mr. Mao’s Troops Went to Jinggangshan

On September 19, 1927, Mr. Mao held the Wenjiashi Meeting in Liuyang, Hunan. At this point, the Autumn Harvest Uprising had failed, Changsha was never taken, and morale among the troops had hit a low. At Wenjiashi, Mao convened an emergency meeting where he rejected the original order to continue attacking Changsha. Instead, he proposed abandoning the cities and turning toward the mountains. His new goal was to move toward the Luoxiao Mountains on the Hunan-Jiangxi border in search of a place to regroup. This was the first time he had defied a military directive from the central leadership. Around September 20, during the withdrawal, the troop numbers dropped sharply due to mass desertions. Mao kept reassuring the soldiers, encouraging them to “preserve strength” and insisting that “where there is a base area, there is hope.”

On September 29, the troops arrived at Ninggang, nestled in the southern foothills of Jinggangshan. They settled in Maoping, a village in Ninggang County on the Jiangxi border, and made contact with a local peasant militia led by Yuan Wencai.

Yuan Wencai was a key local militia leader during Mao’s transition to Jinggangshan after the failure of the uprising. He was one of the earliest actual controllers of the Jinggangshan base area. His background was complex: a mix of peasant roots, bandit experience, and military skills.

Born in 1896 in Maoping village, Ninggang County, Jiangxi Province, Yuan came from a poor farming family. His early life was harsh. He had worked as a hunter, joined a bandit gang out of desperation, and briefly served in the Nationalist army during the Northern Expedition, acquiring basic military training. He eventually established his own militia in the Ninggang region, commanding territory in Maoping and Jingzhushan. Effectively, he controlled the entire southern edge of Jinggangshan.

In October 1927, Mao’s remaining forces from the Autumn Harvest Uprising arrived in Ninggang and encountered both Yuan Wencai and another mountain leader, Wang Zuo. Yuan was initially cautious toward Mao but ultimately accepted his political vision and agreed to jointly build the Jinggangshan base. Mao relied on Yuan’s territorial control and local popularity to gain a foothold. Yuan’s militia became a vital part of what would later be called the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army.

In early 1930, the Jiangxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party lured Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo into a trap and had them assassinated. The official justification was that they were “arrogant and disobedient” and “suspected of betrayal.” The actual reason was likely internal power struggles and distrust between the central leadership and these semi-autonomous local warlords. As always, engaging in politics is risky—lives are at stake. Press freedom, freedom of speech, the right to protest, and the fairness of law enforcement aren’t the same as this kind of warfare. What I’m talking about here is literal war.

After Yuan’s death, Mao did not publicly seek justice for him. Over time, Yuan’s name faded from official Party histories, though in recent years, some scholars and local records have begun to reexamine his contributions. Yuan Wencai represents the complicated nature of early revolutionary local militias. He wasn’t a textbook Communist, but characters like him—who shifted from bandit to peasant to revolutionary—formed the soil from which the early Communist movement grew. As mentioned before, that era had everything: warlords, jobless drifters, peasants, and overseas students—it was a mess. So really, maybe today isn’t so bad. Stability and peace are hard to come by, and they matter. But basic freedoms should still be guaranteed in any peaceful country. Otherwise, what’s the point of that peace? These days, China and the U.S. are once again locking horns, and everyone’s on edge. But the bottom line is, without Yuan Wencai’s support, Mao probably wouldn’t have survived in Jinggangshan.

After settling in the Jinggangshan area, Mao reached a tentative alliance with Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo. He began reorganizing the troops, proposing the creation of the “First Regiment of the First Division of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army.” This restructuring took place in Sanwan, Yongxin County, Jiangxi. Several core principles were introduced there: “Party branches embedded at the company level,” “equality between officers and soldiers,” and “the army serves the people.” I don’t know how well these were actually enforced, but let’s be honest—if people are volunteering to fight and still feel unfairly treated, they’re not going to stick around. Most likely, the reason many stayed was because they didn’t feel wronged. It’s the same as quitting a job—either you’re underpaid or you’re being treated unfairly.

9-2: Armed Separation

In late October, Mr. Mao established an initial base area and began a campaign of armed separation: confiscating land from landlords, redistributing it among peasants, and forming mass organizations. He began treating Jinggangshan as a central base, launching and supporting uprisings and guerrilla operations in surrounding regions such as southern Hunan and southern Jiangxi.

“Armed separation” refers to seizing control of a specific geographic region by relying on one’s own military force, cutting it off from central authorities or enemy powers, and building an independent system of military and political governance. It was a core component of Mr. Mao’s strategy of encircling the cities from the countryside.

They stationed troops and established political institutions—for example, setting up a “Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Government” in Jinggangshan. They expelled or suppressed hostile forces: local officials, landlord militias, and Nationalist troops. At the same time, they built mass organizations, took over public order, land administration, judicial matters, and tax collection. This was not just guerrilla warfare—it was territorial control. It was a form of governance grounded in military power.

The policy of “confiscating land from landlords and distributing it to peasants” was central to the Communist strategy of mobilizing the masses and winning peasant support. “Landlords” referred to the rural elite who owned large estates, had strong ties to local governments, and often exploited tenant farmers. “Confiscation” meant stripping them of their land and property. In practice, this included raiding homes, seizing grain and assets, and redistributing them. Mass “struggle meetings” were held where poor peasants publicly denounced or humiliated landlords and rich farmers—often involving imprisonment, beatings, or even extrajudicial violence (not recommended). At the same time, land was divided among the poor under the slogan “Land to the tiller” (not exactly accurate). Clan power structures were broken up, and ancestral halls, lineage control, and landlord-run religious rituals were dismantled (strongly not recommended).

Zhu De, born in 1886 in Yilong, Sichuan, was a scholar in the late Qing and later a general in the Yunnan Army. He studied military science in Germany and upon return, connected with the Comintern. In 1927, he joined the Nanchang Uprising, and after its failure, led his forces southward, engaging in campaigns across southern Jiangxi and Hunan. In April 1928, he joined with Chen Yi and met up with Mr. Mao in the Jinggangshan region. After the meeting, they formed the Fourth Army of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, with Zhu De as commander-in-chief. He would later become the Commander-in-Chief of the People’s Liberation Army and be named a Marshal of the People’s Republic. References include Biography of Zhu De, A Concise History of the Chinese Communist Party, and Selected Historical Documents from the Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base.

Chen Yi, born in 1901 in Lezhi, Sichuan, studied in France as part of the work-study program and joined the revolution upon returning to China. After the Nanchang Uprising, he became a political officer in Zhu De’s unit. In April 1928, he accompanied Zhu to Jinggangshan, where they met with Mr. Mao. After the founding of the People’s Republic, he held several senior posts including Foreign Minister, Vice Premier, and Marshal. His life is documented in Collected Poems of Chen Yi, Chronicle of Chen Yi, and Biography of Chen Yi.

Around April 28, 1928, Zhu De and Chen Yi’s forces met Mr. Mao in Ninggang. Afterward, they reorganized into the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, with Zhu De as military commander and Mr. Mao as party representative. This marked the beginning of the dual-track leadership structure—military and political—that would shape the Communist movement for years to come.