Autumn Harvest Uprising

8-1: The Eve of the Autumn Harvest Uprising

The five months between April 12, 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek launched the April 12 Purge, and September 9, when the Autumn Harvest Uprising began, were among the most chaotic, painful, and rapidly radicalizing periods for the Chinese Communist Party. ChatGPT suggests this can be understood as a sharp turn from the fantasy of a united front to the pursuit of armed seizure of power.

On April 12, 1927, Chiang Kai-shek launched a purge in Shanghai, massacring Communists and leftist organizations. Soon after, similar events took place in Hunan, Wuhan, Guangzhou, and other regions. Trade unions and peasant associations were disbanded. Countless grassroots cadres were arrested or killed. The Communist Party’s urban structure collapsed rapidly. Party morale was in disarray. Many could not understand how the revolution had suddenly failed—yesterday’s comrades had become today’s fugitives overnight. The most common emotions during this period were terror, confusion, anxiety, and hatred.

The Party was deeply divided. Should they flee or fight? The Chen Duxiu faction, centered around the Wuhan government, advocated maintaining the revolutionary united front and continuing cooperation with Wang Jingwei. They opposed launching an armed uprising immediately. But Chen was labeled a “rightist capitulationist” and was removed from his post as General Secretary in July. The Comintern, along with Zhou Enlai, Qu Qiubai, and others, believed in launching a counterattack. They advocated for armed uprisings across southern China. They emphasized the idea that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun”—though at the time, this phrase had not yet been coined by Mao. It was becoming the Party’s mainstream position. This marked the CCP’s transition from propagating revolution to organizing insurrections.

Starting in mid-July, three major uprisings were planned. The Nanchang Uprising, on August 1, led by Zhou Enlai, He Long, Ye Ting, and others, was the first Communist counterattack with a military background. Although they briefly took Nanchang, it failed within five days. The Autumn Harvest Uprising, led by Mao Zedong, was organized in the border region of Hunan and Jiangxi, aiming to seize Changsha through a peasant rebellion. The last was the Guangzhou Uprising in December, planned by Zhang Tailei and Ye Jianying, which became the final large-scale urban insurrection. All three failed. But Mao was the only one who “turned the corner” in the aftermath—he gave up on the cities, embraced the countryside, and reorganized his forces. This was his turning point.

Mao had personally witnessed the April 12 incident in Shanghai. After escaping, he returned to Hunan. In May, he published an abridged version of the Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan under the name of the Hunan Provincial Committee. Between June and July, he worked to revive peasant associations in Xiangtan and Anyuan, while secretly planning an uprising. In August, he was ordered to form the Frontline Committee for the Autumn Harvest Uprising and led his forces into the Hunan-Jiangxi border region. On September 9, the uprising officially began.

8-2: Details of the Uprising

The autumn rains had not yet arrived, but the air over the Hunan-Jiangxi border already felt as heavy as a well. On September 9, 1927, the Autumn Harvest Uprising officially broke out. It was a centrally approved strategic counteroffensive. On the surface, it had mobilization, command structures, and a roadmap. The goal was to march on Changsha, take Hunan, and establish a Soviet government.

In reality, however, the force had only just been assembled. Morale was shaky, and supplies of food and ammunition were insufficient. Mao Zedong was the Secretary of the Frontline Committee but not a military commander. He was a political figure known for writing investigative reports, not a general skilled in battlefield tactics. Moreover, the force he led was not a conventional army—it consisted of peasants, miners, students, and a few officers who had broken away from the National Revolutionary Army. No one knew how long the fighting would last, where to go, or what chance they had of winning.

The uprising broke out on September 9, 1927, during the eighth lunar month, which marked the beginning of the autumn harvest season in southern China. In an agricultural society, farming cycles were often tied to political mobilization. Using “Autumn Harvest” as a code name provided camouflage—it could be interpreted as an agricultural operation rather than a political movement.

The term “Autumn Harvest” symbolized labor, hope, and harvest, making it easy to infuse with meanings like “reaping the old order, sowing the new revolution.” Like later slogans such as “spring plowing mobilization” and “winter training and party rectification,” it reflected the CCP’s agrarian narrative style and resonated with the language of rural populations.

At the time of the uprising, there was no unified name like “Autumn Harvest Uprising.” It was more often referred to as the “uprising on the Hunan-Jiangxi border,” the “Southern Hunan uprising,” or simply “the assault on Changsha.” The name “Autumn Harvest Uprising” was adopted later, after Mao succeeded in establishing a base on Jinggangshan and began summarizing the experience. It was eventually enshrined in the CCP’s official history as one of the “Three Major Uprisings”: Nanchang, Autumn Harvest, and Guangzhou.

The uprising was approved by the CCP Central Military Commission and the Comintern. Mao Zedong was appointed Secretary of the Frontline Committee. The plan was to use the border region of Hunan and Jiangxi—specifically Pingxiang, Liuyang, and Pingjiang—as the base, march on Changsha, and establish a revolutionary regime.

Mao’s troops were assembled from multiple sources. The Pingjiang Workers’ and Peasants’ Volunteer Army was a peasant militia organized by Peng Gongda. The Anyuan miners’ Red Guards were a worker militia strongly influenced by Mao. Some former officers from the National Revolutionary Army defected with their units. There were also students, local radicals, and fringe elements.

The uprising headquarters was set up in Wenjiashi, and the plan involved three advancing forces. The eastern column, led by Peng Gongda from Pingjiang, aimed to enter Changsha from the north. The western column, led by Mao and Lu Deming from Liuyang, consisted mostly of miners and former soldiers and was to approach from the east. The central column, led by Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo from Pingxiang, was made up of mountain guerrillas and was to flank Changsha from the outskirts.

There was no wireless communication. Orders were relayed by couriers. Mao and Lu Deming, though nominally in charge, could only directly command their own unit. The peasants, miners, and guerrillas varied greatly in training and moved at different paces. Local towns and counties were already on alert. The plan had been leaked before the action began, and the troops were forced to react passively.

8-3: The Outcome of the Uprising

The troops originally planned to converge around September 15 to launch a coordinated assault on Changsha. However, both the central and eastern columns were exposed prematurely and faced fierce counterattacks from Hunan warlord Wang Tianpei’s forces. The peasant militias in Pingjiang initiated action as early as September 9. Yuan Wencai’s unit, due to complex terrain and poor communication, also moved ahead of schedule. Without wireless radios or centralized coordination, the result was a disjointed and chaotic advance. Mao and Lu Deming had hoped to wait for the others, but there was no time—they had already been exposed.

Mao and Lu Deming tried to maintain a unified plan, but figures like Peng Gongda and Yuan Wencai were already well-known locally. Their efforts to mobilize peasant associations, gather troops, and store weapons made secrecy impossible. Local reactionary forces and landlord militias had long had informants, and reports of impending rebellion had reached government ears well before the uprising. It is said that Peng Gongda even posted flyers and chanted slogans in Pingjiang, essentially announcing the revolt to their enemies.

After the April 12 purge, local reactionary forces had already cracked down on peasant associations. When the uprising began, these groups were under heavy surveillance. Some peasant organizations had only just been revived and were immediately asked to rebel again. The local militias had already set up ambushes. Wang Tianpei’s troops in Changsha had prepared for every possible route of attack. Mao’s faction had long emphasized class struggle and land redistribution, which directly threatened landlords and clan networks. Many locals reported to Changsha in advance, warning of “Red Army” insurgents and armed peasant associations. Given the previous radicalism of the Hunan peasant movement, many militia groups armed themselves preemptively and launched attacks on their own.

On September 15, Lu Deming was killed in battle by a headshot from Hunan forces. Mao’s main column was blocked east of Changsha due to poor road conditions and could not reach the city’s outskirts. The assault collapsed due to scattered forces, insufficient weaponry, and poor coordination.

On September 19, Mao decided to retreat. He led his troops to Wenjiashi in Liuyang, Hunan, and held what became known as the Wenjiashi Conference. He rejected the order to continue attacking Changsha. He announced a withdrawal from the urban strategy and a shift toward the Luoxiao Mountains, entering the rural hinterlands. This marked the first time Mao disobeyed a central directive and made an independent military and political decision.