White Terror

7-3: Soviet Promotion of the KMT–CPC Alliance

In 1923, Sun Yat-sen signed the Sun–Joffe Manifesto with the Soviet Union, marking the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the USSR. The Soviets saw revolutionary potential in China. They believed that by helping the Kuomintang (KMT) carry out a bourgeois democratic revolution, they could pave the way for a future socialist revolution. This was exactly the united front strategy envisioned by Lenin, with China as the experimental ground in the East.

According to various sources, the Soviet Union provided at least three to five million rubles between 1924 and 1926. The funds supported the operations of the Whampoa Military Academy, including cadet living expenses and military equipment, as well as the KMT’s propaganda apparatus and logistics during military campaigns. A Soviet advisory team led by Borodin (real name Mikhail Markovich Gruzenberg) arrived in Guangzhou and became Sun Yat-sen’s de facto chief adviser in politics, military affairs, and propaganda. Borodin even helped draft the KMT’s new party constitution, which introduced the Soviet-style system of party control over the military and the establishment of party cells down to the company level. In terms of military aid, the Soviets supplied light and heavy machine guns, a large quantity of rifles and ammunition. The KMT adopted the model of the Red Army, training its first group of political officers and restructuring the Whampoa Academy’s curriculum to include political education.

Borodin was a Soviet political adviser and Comintern envoy to China, and the most influential Soviet figure during the first United Front. Born in 1884 in Latvia to a Jewish family, he had been a lawyer and revolutionary who joined the Bolsheviks early on. “Borodin” was an alias, a common practice among Soviet agents abroad.

In 1923, following Lenin’s directive to support national revolutions in the East, Borodin arrived in China as a Soviet adviser. He embedded himself in the KMT’s internal structure and became more than an adviser—he was a strategist. He helped reorganize the KMT, guided the drafting of the 1924 KMT Manifesto and its new constitution, promoted cooperation with the Communist Party, expanded mass movements, and helped establish the Whampoa Academy. He was Sun Yat-sen’s shadow power.

Borodin introduced the strategy of building Communist cells within the KMT, set up a political department at Whampoa, and instilled the idea that the Party must command the army. He encouraged KMT and CPC cadres to embed themselves among workers and peasants to organize grassroots movements, following the Soviet model. After the anti-Communist purge in 1927, Borodin was forced to leave China, returned to the USSR, and was politically marginalized. During Stalin’s Great Purge in 1937, he was arrested and executed. Politics is no joke. Lives are at stake. As long as we’re studying history, this should be fine. If not, we’ll deal with it when it happens.

The reason the Soviet Union supported both the KMT and the Communist Party during the 1920s was strategic. They believed that China, still under feudalism and imperialist oppression, was not yet ready for a socialist revolution. The first step had to be a bourgeois democratic revolution: overthrowing the warlords, expelling imperialist influence, and building a unified nation. The Communist Party was too weak to accomplish that on its own. So the Soviets supported a strong nationalist party—specifically the left-leaning faction of the KMT under Sun Yat-sen.

Publicly, the Soviet Union backed the KMT’s national unification efforts and industrial modernization under the banner of a revolutionary united front. Privately, they encouraged the Communist Party to infiltrate the KMT, build grassroots organizations such as peasant associations and labor unions, expand their armed forces, and prepare to eventually take power.

Borodin was tasked with leading this effort: helping the KMT revise its constitution, organize the Whampoa Military Academy, enforce party control over the army, and expand peasant-worker networks. The entire strategy was a replication of Bolshevik methods. At that time, the Communist Party functioned as a subordinate unit within the KMT and was expected to obey united front discipline, accept KMT leadership, and quietly build its own strength.

The Soviet Union underestimated the autonomy of the KMT, especially Chiang Kai-shek’s ambitions and anti-Communist instincts. The Communist Party grew quickly and visibly, alarming the right wing of the KMT. Chiang seized military control at Whampoa ahead of schedule and struck first with a purge.

7-4: The Zhongshan Warship Incident

The Zhongshan Warship Incident occurred on March 20, 1926. It was the first open confrontation between Chiang Kai-shek and the Soviet–Communist bloc, and is widely viewed as the prelude to the purge. By 1926, the left-wing faction of the KMT, including Wang Jingwei, Soviet advisers like Borodin, and members of the Communist Party, were gaining influence. Although Chiang was the principal of the Whampoa Military Academy and held some military power, he lacked control over the Party itself. Meanwhile, Soviet advisers were deeply embedded in Chinese political and military institutions, promoting party control over the military and organizing peasant-worker movements. Chiang felt increasingly sidelined.

The Zhongshan was a main vessel of the National Revolutionary Army, commanded by Communist officer Li Zhilong. On March 18–19, the ship unexpectedly sailed near the Whampoa Military Academy and anchored with its guns facing the presidential office in Guangzhou. Whampoa’s radio station intercepted mysterious signals, hinting at a possible military action. Chiang believed a coup was imminent.

He responded immediately. On March 20, he sealed off all roads in Guangzhou, shut down communications controlled by the Communists, arrested Li Zhilong and other Communist officers, and placed Borodin under house arrest. He took control of the Zhongshan, consolidated his military power, and began a limited purge of Communist personnel within the Academy.

The Soviet side chose to step back. Borodin admitted there had been a “misunderstanding” and that the Communist side had acted on its own. He offered to handle the matter internally. Chiang gained control over military and political affairs in Guangzhou, but did not yet completely break the alliance. He continued to frame it as an internal correction in the spirit of revolutionary unity.

Sun Yat-sen had died in March 1925. The KMT lost its spiritual core and power began to fragment. From summer to fall of 1925, Wang Jingwei oversaw Party affairs and Borodin’s influence peaked. The left gained momentum, while the Communist Party expanded its networks. After the Zhongshan incident in March 1926, Chiang attempted to use it as a pretext to purge the Communists, but failed and was temporarily checked. In May 1926, Chiang proposed a visit to the Soviet Union to seek direct recognition as the sole military leader. From July 13 to 26, he visited Moscow, receiving high-level treatment and meeting Trotsky, Voroshilov, and others.

7-5: Chiang Kai-shek’s 1926 Visit to the Soviet Union

In July 1926, Chiang led a delegation to the Soviet Union. Officially, the visit was to thank the USSR for supporting the National Revolutionary Army and to study Soviet revolutionary experiences. In reality, Chiang wanted to clarify the USSR’s stance on China’s political factions and to strengthen his own legitimacy. He felt threatened by leftist forces within the KMT that had Soviet backing.

The stated purpose was to express gratitude for Soviet military aid during the Northern Expedition and to examine Soviet military and industrial systems, in the spirit of KMT–Soviet cooperation. But Chiang’s real goal was to bypass Borodin, gain direct Soviet recognition as the supreme military leader, undermine Soviet support for the KMT’s left wing, and assess whether the Soviet state structure could be adapted to China—or whether it was fundamentally uncontrollable.

Chiang met Trotsky, who reportedly distrusted him. He also met Voroshilov and Chinese members of the Comintern, who were skeptical of his nationalism. The Soviets demanded continued KMT–CPC cooperation and deeper party–army integration. Chiang insisted that the military obey a unified command structure and opposed the insertion of political commissars into the army. He also asked for more military aid. The Soviets gave vague answers, avoiding the question of whether Chiang could be trusted.

Chiang’s Diaries, preserved at Stanford’s Hoover Institution Archives, began in 1917 and continued nearly uninterrupted until his death in 1972. Written entirely by hand in Chinese, they contain dense reflections on politics, people, ideology, religion, emotion, and personal fate. Originally kept by the Chiang family, they were later donated to Hoover. Many volumes, especially from the 1920s to 1949, have been made publicly accessible.

He wrote in his diary:

“This journey revealed to me the three spheres of Soviet life—Party, Government, and Army—and I was filled with fear. The Soviet army is not an army, but politics in uniform. The Party is everywhere, with ranks and titles exaggerated. There is no freedom for the people. These are not people, they are slaves.”

After returning home, Chiang began purging Communists and leftist cadets from Whampoa. Figures like Zhou Yiqun and Yun Daiying were marginalized, monitored, or reassigned. Chiang limited Borodin’s influence and, during the Northern Expedition, repeatedly bypassed Soviet and Communist commands to carry out independent operations. Labor unions and peasant associations in Shanghai, Hunan, and Jiangxi came under strict surveillance.

He also wrote in his diary: “The Russians are not people. They are beasts.”

Yet between the lines was a deeper fear. Chiang was not afraid of the left; he was afraid of chaos. He could not accept a political order where workers controlled the factories and peasants redistributed land. He did not believe that the common people were capable of governing a nation. He believed in order, discipline, loyalty, and efficiency—not in debate, equality, or mobilization. What frightened him most was the Soviet idea that the Party should control the army. Whampoa had been founded by him. The National Revolutionary Army was his loyal force. Now these very units were being infiltrated by Communist political departments and liaison officers.

On April 12, 1927, in the night air of Shanghai, the streets were already plastered with notices: all Communists and leftist KMT members must surrender within three days, or face severe consequences.

That night, Chiang deployed the 26th Army stationed in Shanghai, the police department, the Green Gang, and several civilian groups to launch mass arrests and executions of Communist Party members and leftist activists. The workers’ militias had their weapons confiscated. Many were beaten to death in public, buried alive, or taken away without ever returning. In Shanghai alone, over 300 people were killed in this purge. The list had been prepared in advance. So had their addresses. Some were reported by neighbors. Some were betrayed by informants. Some were simply suspected of looking the part.

People disappeared. The streets became strangely quiet.

The revolution became orderly overnight.

Some say April 12 was the beginning of the KMT–CPC split. But in truth, the alliance was a failed marriage from the very start. They seemed to have common enemies—warlords, imperialists, the old order—but what they truly feared was each other. The Communists feared Chiang’s uncontrollability. Chiang feared the Communists’ uncontrollability.

The White Terror had begun.