Created on
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2026
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Updated on
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2026
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Location
Oakland, CA
New World (iii): Why Portugal?
新大陆(iii):葡萄牙被逼出海
前言:For the One Piece!!!! 本文和chatGPT合作完成。
在欧洲早期海外扩张中,葡萄牙通常被视为最早持续推进远洋探索的国家之一。葡萄牙在13世纪中期基本完成了收复失地运动,1297年通过《阿尔卡尼斯条约》确立了相对稳定的边界框架;14世纪末的继承危机在1385年以阿维什王朝的建立告终。到15世纪初,葡萄牙已经进入一个相对稳定的王权结构之中,领土边界清晰,内部政治秩序较为稳固。
这种较早完成领土整合与王权稳定的状态,既是优势,也带来一种结构性限制。相较于仍可通过内陆扩张、长期战争或领土整合来重塑增长空间的王国,葡萄牙的内陆腹地与人口规模较小,使其通过内部市场放大或陆地扩张来缓解财政与增长约束的空间更为有限。在此条件下,对外扩张逐渐成为一个更具吸引力的选项。
这种限制首先体现在农业条件上。伊比利亚半岛西部的自然环境使农业生产的稳定性与规模扩张面临客观约束,粮食剩余与税基的增长潜力有限。农业并非无法维持国家运转,但其难以为持续的人口增长与城市扩展提供充足支持。农业税基因此对战争、灾荒或贸易波动极为敏感,国家财政承压能力相对脆弱。
在农业难以提供显著剩余的前提下,手工业本可成为突破口。然而,中世纪手工业竞争的关键不仅在于技术能力,还在于规模、网络与标准化生产。葡萄牙城市规模普遍较小,行会组织相对分散,生产以满足本地或近距离市场为主,难以形成可进入欧洲核心市场的优势产品。这意味着,在既有贸易体系中,葡萄牙较难获得议价权或不可替代的商品地位。
更高利润的东方香料贸易,在理论上具备改变这一局面的潜力。香料在中世纪既是奢侈消费品,也广泛用于医药与食品保存,具有高附加值与远距运输优势。然而,地中海转口贸易长期处于威尼斯等意大利商邦的有利位置,使伊比利亚西端国家难以在既有链条中获得同等利润。葡萄牙并非无法进入这一体系,但通常只能以较不利的条件参与其中,难以通过现有结构完成有效资本积累。
在这种被既有体系边缘化的处境下,葡萄牙并非“别无选择”,但其内部替代路径相对有限。相较于法国等更大王国可以依托农业剩余与人口扩张建立内循环,或意大利城邦依靠金融与转口贸易嵌入高价值网络,葡萄牙的国家规模与腹地深度使这些路径的可行性相对较低。对外探索因此逐渐从可选项转变为具有战略意义的方向。
1415年对休达的占领,常被视为这一阶段的重要起点。休达位于直布罗陀海峡南岸,被认为与跨撒哈拉贸易网络相连。葡萄牙最初希望通过控制这一节点,进入既有黄金与商路体系。然而,史学界普遍指出,休达的防务成本高昂,经济回报未达预期,贸易网络并未如设想般依附于城市本身。这一经验促使葡萄牙逐步将重心转向沿非洲海岸的持续探索,而非依赖单一陆上贸易节点。
与葡萄牙不同,西班牙在15世纪末的处境并非内陆路径耗尽后的被动转向。卡斯蒂利亚与阿拉贡的联合,以及1492年格拉纳达的陷落,标志着收复失地运动的结束。国家整合刚刚完成,贵族、军队与宗教力量仍处于高度动员状态。西班牙的海外探索因此并非主要出于经济边缘化压力,而更多与扩张传统和新资源寻求相关。
哥伦布的航行,最初意在寻找通往亚洲的新路径,却意外抵达美洲大陆。随后的西班牙扩张模式,以领土征服、矿产开采与人口控制为核心。白银矿的发现极大扩张了国家财政规模,同时也在16至17世纪的长期过程中与通货膨胀、产业结构变化及对外依赖加深相关。与葡萄牙通过航线控制嵌入贸易体系的路径相比,西班牙更多依赖直接的领土统治与资源抽取。
如果说葡萄牙面对的是内部增长空间有限的问题,那么以明代为代表的中国帝国则处于相反情形。中国拥有广阔连续的内陆腹地、成熟的农业体系与可以在内部完成资源循环的经济结构。国家财政主要依赖土地、人口与赋税,而非远距贸易。对这样体量的帝国而言,对外贸易并非生存前提。
郑和下西洋的官方目标主要具有政治与外交性质,强调展示皇权、重建朝贡秩序与确认区域等级。尽管这些航行也对区域商业交流产生影响,但其组织逻辑并不以长期驻点、航线控制或利润最大化为核心。在明代制度框架中,远洋贸易意味着更高的不确定性与更难以行政化管理的风险。当国家关注点转向北方边防与内陆治理时,航海活动的收缩可以被理解为制度理性下的优先级调整。
正是在这一背景下,葡萄牙沿非洲海岸逐步推进的航海战略显现出其独特性。15世纪的航海技术条件极其有限,经度难以准确测量,远离陆地意味着极高风险。在此条件下,沿岸逐步推进既是一种风险控制策略,也是一种经验积累方式。航海从一次性冒险转变为可重复、可学习的过程。
这一长期探索得以持续的关键,在于国家层面的连续支持。葡萄牙王权在15世纪具备较强的动员能力与决策连续性,使国家能够长期投入高失败率、低短期回报的航海项目。失败被吸收为经验,损失被视为成本。这种制度性的容错能力,使航海探索逐渐从生存性尝试转变为位置跃迁的工具。
当航线逐渐被证明可以绕开既有贸易体系时,葡萄牙获得了直接接触亚洲高价值商品源头的可能性。通过掌握路线而非依附节点,其在价格、利润与战略主动权上获得了新的空间。在这一过程中,葡萄牙从欧洲边缘国家,转变为新兴全球贸易体系中的关键中介者。
Preface: For the ONE PIECE!!! This essay was co-written with ChatGPT.
In the early phase of European overseas expansion, Portugal is commonly regarded as one of the first states to pursue sustained maritime exploration. By the mid-thirteenth century, Portugal had largely completed the Reconquista within its territory. The Treaty of Alcañices in 1297 established a relatively stable border framework, and the succession crisis of the late fourteenth century concluded in 1385 with the rise of the Aviz dynasty. By the early fifteenth century, Portugal had entered a period of comparatively stable royal authority, with clearly defined borders and a consolidated internal political order.
This early consolidation of territory and monarchy was both an advantage and a structural constraint. Compared with kingdoms that could still rely on inland expansion, prolonged warfare, or territorial integration to generate new growth, Portugal’s smaller hinterland and population limited the effectiveness of such strategies. Under these conditions, outward expansion gradually became a more attractive option.
This constraint first appeared in agricultural conditions. The natural environment of western Iberia imposed objective limits on the stability and scalability of agricultural production. While sufficient to sustain the state, agriculture offered limited capacity to support sustained population growth and urban expansion. The fiscal base derived from land was therefore highly sensitive to war, famine, or trade fluctuations, leaving state finances relatively fragile.
In the absence of substantial agricultural surplus, craft production might have offered a path forward. However, medieval industrial competitiveness depended not only on technical skill, but also on scale, networks, and standardized production. Portuguese cities were generally small, guild structures relatively dispersed, and production oriented toward local or nearby markets. This made it difficult to develop goods capable of entering core European markets as indispensable commodities. Within existing trade systems, Portugal thus struggled to gain bargaining power or establish an irreplaceable commercial position.
The highly profitable spice trade from the East, in theory, held the potential to change this situation. In the medieval period, spices were both luxury goods and widely used in medicine and food preservation, combining high value with ease of long-distance transport. Yet Mediterranean intermediary trade long remained in the advantageous hands of Italian maritime republics such as Venice, making it difficult for western Iberian states to achieve comparable profits within established routes. Portugal was not excluded from participation, but typically entered on less favorable terms that made capital accumulation difficult.
In this context of marginalization within existing systems, Portugal was not entirely without options, but its internal alternatives were relatively limited. Compared with larger kingdoms such as France, which could rely on agricultural surplus and demographic expansion to build internal economic cycles, or Italian city-states that embedded themselves in high-value networks through finance and re-export trade, Portugal’s scale and geographic depth made such paths less feasible. External exploration therefore gradually shifted from being merely optional to strategically significant.
The 1415 conquest of Ceuta is often regarded as an important starting point in this process. Located on the southern shore of the Strait of Gibraltar, Ceuta was believed to be connected to trans-Saharan trade networks. Portugal initially hoped that by controlling this node it could access existing gold and trade routes. However, historians widely note that the defensive costs of Ceuta were high and the economic returns fell short of expectations. Trade networks proved to be attached not to the city itself but to flexible routes. This experience encouraged Portugal to shift its focus toward sustained exploration along the African coast rather than reliance on a single inland trade node.
Spain’s situation in the late fifteenth century differed from Portugal’s. The union of Castile and Aragon and the fall of Granada in 1492 marked the end of the Reconquista. State consolidation had just been achieved, and aristocratic, military, and religious forces remained highly mobilized. Spanish overseas exploration therefore arose less from economic marginalization and more from an existing expansionist momentum and the search for new resources.
Columbus’s voyage, originally intended to find a new route to Asia, instead reached the American continent. Subsequent Spanish expansion centered on territorial conquest, mineral extraction, and population control. The discovery of major silver mines greatly expanded royal finances, while over the long term in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries also correlating with inflation, structural economic shifts, and increasing external dependence. Compared with Portugal’s strategy of integrating into trade systems through control of routes, Spain relied more directly on territorial rule and resource extraction.
If Portugal faced limitations in internal growth space, the Ming Chinese empire presented the opposite case. China possessed a vast and continuous inland territory, a mature agrarian system, and an economy capable of internal resource circulation. State finance depended primarily on land, population, and taxation rather than long-distance maritime trade. For an empire of this scale, foreign trade was not a condition of survival.
The official objectives of Zheng He’s voyages were primarily political and diplomatic, emphasizing the display of imperial authority, the reconstruction of tributary order, and the confirmation of regional hierarchy. Although these expeditions did influence regional commercial exchange, their organizational logic did not prioritize permanent bases, route control, or profit maximization. Within the Ming institutional framework, long-distance maritime trade represented higher uncertainty and lower administrative controllability. As state priorities shifted toward northern defense and inland governance, the contraction of maritime activity can be understood as a rational reprioritization within the system.
Against this background, Portugal’s gradual maritime advance along the African coast reveals its distinctive character. Fifteenth-century navigation conditions were extremely limited: longitude could not be measured accurately, ship durability was fragile, and voyages far from land carried extreme risk. Coastal progression was therefore both a strategy of risk control and a method of cumulative learning. Maritime exploration evolved from one-time ventures into repeatable, improvable processes.
The continuity of this long exploration depended on sustained state support. Portuguese royal authority in the fifteenth century possessed the capacity for mobilization and decision continuity, enabling long-term investment in ventures with high failure rates and low immediate returns. Failures were absorbed as experience, and losses treated as costs rather than endpoints. This institutional tolerance for error gradually transformed maritime exploration from a survival strategy into a tool for positional transformation.
As maritime routes increasingly demonstrated the ability to bypass established trade systems, Portugal gained direct access to the sources of high-value Asian goods. By mastering routes rather than relying on nodes, it acquired new leverage over pricing, profit distribution, and strategic initiative. In this process, Portugal moved from being a peripheral European kingdom to becoming a key intermediary within an emerging global trade network.
